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Opting Out of Good Governance

Author

Listed:
  • C. Fritz Foley
  • Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham
  • Jonathan Greenstein
  • Eric Zwick

Abstract

Cross-listing on a U.S. exchange does not bond foreign firms to follow the corporate governance rules of that exchange. Hand-collected data show that 80% of cross-listed firms opt out of at least one exchange governance rule, instead committing to observe the rules of their home country. Relative to firms that comply, firms that opt out have weaker governance practices in that they have a smaller share of independent directors. The decision to opt out reflects the relative costs and benefits of doing so. Cross-listed firms opt out more when coming from countries with weak corporate governance rules, but if firms based in such countries are growing and have a need for external finance, they are more likely to comply. Finally, opting out affects the value of cash holdings. For cross-listed firms based in countries with weak governance rules, a dollar of cash held inside the firm is worth $1.52 if the firm fully complies with U.S. exchange rules but just $0.32 if it is non-compliant.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Fritz Foley & Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Jonathan Greenstein & Eric Zwick, 2014. "Opting Out of Good Governance," NBER Working Papers 19953, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:19953
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    3. Marwa Khouya & Abdelhay Benabdelhadi, 2023. "The contribution of public communication on the good governance process: The case of public institutions in Morocco," Post-Print hal-04066907, HAL.
    4. Licht, Amir N. & Poliquin, Christopher & Siegel, Jordan I. & Li, Xi, 2018. "What makes the bonding stick? A natural experiment testing the legal bonding hypothesis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 129(2), pages 329-356.
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    6. Ghosh, Chinmoy & He, Fan & Zhou, Haoyong, 2021. "On the role of foreign directors: Evidence from cross-listed firms," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 177-202.

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    JEL classification:

    • F21 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Investment; Long-Term Capital Movements
    • G3 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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