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Competition Policy Evaluation through Damage Estimation in Fuel Retail Cartel

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  • Cuiabano, Simone

Abstract

I estimate the fuel retailer cartel damages in the south of Brazil using reduced and structural forms for supply and demand. Brazilian Competition Authority (CADE) documents help to characterize the ethanol and gasoline retailers involved in the collusion. The objective is to evaluate competition policy by comparing the amount of estimated damages with the amount of applied fines. This paper also adds an important result to gasoline substitution, as data shows that ethanol is perceived as a perfect substitute and it is price inelastic. Results show an overcharge of 4.6% to 6.6% in the gasoline market and up to 12% in the ethanol market during collusion. Fines should consider the deterrence effect and, giving the low probability of detection, CADE’s applied fines seemed to be in line with this objective.

Suggested Citation

  • Cuiabano, Simone, 2017. "Competition Policy Evaluation through Damage Estimation in Fuel Retail Cartel," TSE Working Papers 17-847, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
  • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:32100
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Silveira, Douglas & Vasconcelos, Silvinha & Resende, Marcelo & Cajueiro, Daniel O., 2022. "Won’t Get Fooled Again: A supervised machine learning approach for screening gasoline cartels," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C).
    2. Koski, Heli, 2018. "How Do Competition Policy and Data Brokers Shape Product Market Competition?," ETLA Working Papers 61, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.

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