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Alliances Electorales entre Deux Tours de Scrutin : Le Point de Vue de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs et une Application aux Elections Régionales de Mars 2010

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  • Le Breton, Michel
  • Van Der Straeten, Karine

Abstract

L’objet de cet article est d’examiner, à la lumière de deux solutions majeures de la théorie des jeux coopératifs, les coalitions/négociations électorales qui ont lieu dans le cas où le mode de scrutin est un scrutin proportionnel avec listes bloquées, prime au gagnant et comportant deux tours en l’absence de majorité absolue au premier tour. Cet environnement électoral décrit les élections des conseillers régionaux qui se sont tenues en France les 14 et 21 Mars 2010.

Suggested Citation

  • Le Breton, Michel & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2012. "Alliances Electorales entre Deux Tours de Scrutin : Le Point de Vue de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs et une Application aux Elections Régionales de Mars 2010," TSE Working Papers 12-295, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    • Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:25768
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    Cited by:

    1. Michel Le Breton & Karine Van Der Straeten, 2017. "Alliances Électorales et Gouvernementales : La Contribution de la Théorie des Jeux Coopératifs à la Science Politique," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 127(4), pages 637-736.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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