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The Tragedy of the Masks: curbing stockpiling behavior through a 'victim'

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  • Giuseppe Danese
  • Luigi Mittone

Abstract

The phenomenon of household products disappearing from supermarket shelves after the COVID-19 outbreak has received strong attention in the media. After a negative shock, household products can be viewed as a common-pool resource subject to a rule of capture by the first appropriator. Using a sample of US participants, we show that when the participants are informed that a fixed supply of facial masks exists, they often coordinate on an egalitarian allocation of masks. In another study in which it is brought to the participants' attention that COVID-19 disproportionately affects the elderly population, participants 24 or younger spontaneously demand fewer masks than 65 or older participants. A group of incentivized external observers identifies a prudentially-low demand for masks as appropriate in this environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Giuseppe Danese & Luigi Mittone, 2022. "The Tragedy of the Masks: curbing stockpiling behavior through a 'victim'," CEEL Working Papers 2201, Cognitive and Experimental Economics Laboratory, Department of Economics, University of Trento, Italia.
    • Handle: RePEc:trn:utwpce:2201
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    File URL: https://www-ceel.economia.unitn.it/papers/papero22_01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    COVID-19; common-pool resource; stockpiling; identified victim;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General

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