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Central bank communication and output stabilization

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Hoeberichts, M.M.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

  • Tesfaselassie, M.F.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

Some central banks have a reputation for being secretive. A justification for this behaviour that we find in the literature is that being transparent about operations and beliefs hinders the central bank in achieving the best outcome. In other words, a central bank needs flexibility and therefore cannot be fully transparent. Using a forward-looking New-Keynesian model, we find exactly the opposite. A central bank that is conservative improves output stabilization by being transparent about the procedures it uses to assess the economy and, especially, about the forecast errors it makes. Under certain conditions transparency by a conservative central bank also improves interest rate stabilization. We also find that higher transparency makes it optimal for the central bank to be more conservative as the benefits from higher transparency in terms of output stabilization are greater the more conservative the central bank is.
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Suggested Citation

  • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Hoeberichts, M.M. & Tesfaselassie, M.F., 2009. "Central bank communication and output stabilization," Other publications TiSEM ea078ea2-6ec7-461f-9545-6, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:ea078ea2-6ec7-461f-9545-629b96f6f768
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Martin Geiger & Johann Scharler, 2018. "How do consumers interpret the macroeconomic effects of oil price fluctuations? Evidence from U.S. survey data," Working Papers 2018-13, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, Universität Innsbruck.
    2. James, Jonathan G. & Lawler, Phillip, 2010. "Macroeconomic shocks, unionized labour markets and central bank disclosure policy: How beneficial is increased transparency?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4), pages 506-516, December.
    3. Francesco Cendron & Gianfranco Tusset, 2014. "Central BanksÕ Transparency: Words as Signals," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0178, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno".
    4. Menguy, Séverine, 2006. "Les limites du cadre institutionnel européen," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(3), pages 395-418, septembre.
    5. Yutaka Kurihara, 2014. "Do European Central Bank Announcements Influence Stock Prices and Exchange Rates?," Journal of Applied Finance & Banking, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 4(4), pages 1-1.
    6. Martin Geiger & Johann Scharler, 2021. "How Do People Interpret Macroeconomic Shocks? Evidence from U.S. Survey Data," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 53(4), pages 813-843, June.
    7. Christoph S. Weber, 2020. "The unemployment effect of central bank transparency," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 59(6), pages 2947-2975, December.
    8. Meixing Dai & Moïse Sidiropoulos & Eleftherios Spyromitros, 2015. "Fiscal Policy, Institutional Quality and Central Bank Transparency," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 83(5), pages 523-545, September.
    9. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B., 2008. "The economic impact of central bank transparency," Other publications TiSEM 86c1ba91-1952-45b4-adac-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. van der Cruijsen, C.A.B. & Eijffinger, S.C.W., 2007. "The Economic Impact of Central Bank Transparency : A Survey," Discussion Paper 2007-06, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    11. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli, 2016. "From Silence to Voice: Monetary Policy, Central Bank Governance and Communication," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 1627, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    12. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy and financial markets: evidence from Twitter traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    13. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    14. Ehrmann, Michael & Fratzscher, Marcel, 2007. "The timing of central bank communication," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 124-145, March.
    15. Pacheco, Luis, 2010. "ECB Projections: should leave it to the pros?," Working Papers 11/2010, Universidade Portucalense, Centro de Investigação em Gestão e Economia (CIGE).
    16. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2021. "Monetary policy, Twitter and financial markets: evidence from social media traffic," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 21160, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    17. Omotosho, Babatunde S. & Tumala, Mohammed M., 2019. "A Text Mining Analysis of Central Bank Monetary Policy Communication in Nigeria," MPRA Paper 98850, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    18. Geiger, Martin & Gründler, Daniel & Scharler, Johann, 2023. "Monetary policy shocks and consumer expectations in the euro area," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    19. Nicholas Apergis & Ioannis Pragidis, 2019. "Stock Price Reactions to Wire News from the European Central Bank: Evidence from Changes in the Sentiment Tone and International Market Indexes," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 91-112, February.
    20. Omotosho, Babatunde S., 2020. "Central Bank Communication during Economic Recessions: Evidence from Nigeria," MPRA Paper 99655, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Donato Masciandaro & Davide Romelli & Gaia Rubera, 2020. "Tweeting on Monetary Policy and Market Sentiments: The Central Bank Surprise Index," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 20134, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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