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Social Preference in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments

Author

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  • Riedl, A.
  • Vyrastekova, J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Riedl, A. & Vyrastekova, J., 2002. "Social Preference in Three-Player Ultimatum Game Experiments," Other publications TiSEM 8cc2e577-0529-48fd-ad33-4, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:8cc2e577-0529-48fd-ad33-45114c1c5156
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/541026/5.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, 1999. "Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model," Economics Working Papers 441, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jan 2000.
    2. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868.
    3. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Werner Güth & Carsten Schmidt & Matthias Sutter, 2007. "Bargaining outside the lab - a newspaper experiment of a three-person ultimatum game," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(518), pages 449-469, March.

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