Technology driven organizational structure of the firm
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- René Brink & Pieter Ruys, 2008. "Technology driven organizational structure of the firm," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 481-503, October.
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Cited by:
- Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Rajnish Kumar, 2019.
"Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value,"
Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 155-188, December.
- Chakrabarti, Subhadip & Ghintran, Amandine, 2013. "Assignment of Heterogeneous Agents in Trees under the Permission Value," MPRA Paper 49115, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Subhadip Chakrabarti & Amandine Ghintran & Rajnish Kumar, 2019. "Assignment of heterogeneous agents in trees under the permission value," Post-Print hal-02501134, HAL.
- Pieter H.M. RUYS, 2014. "Architecture of an Economy with Social Enterprises: the Relational Capacity Approach," CIRIEC Working Papers 1413, CIRIEC - Université de Liège.
- Tobias Hiller, 2021. "Hierarchy and the size of a firm," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 68(3), pages 389-404, September.
- René Brink, 2017. "Games with a permission structure - A survey on generalizations and applications," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 25(1), pages 1-33, April.
- René Brink & Chris Dietz, 2014.
"Games with a local permission structure: separation of authority and value generation,"
Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 343-361, March.
- Rene van den Brink & Chris Dietz, 2012. "Games with a Local Permission Structure: Separation of Authority and Value Generation," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 12-126/II, Tinbergen Institute.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
- L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
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