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Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices

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  • Kultti, K.K.

Abstract

We determine the equilibrium in two transaction mechanisms: auctions and posted prices. Agents choose whether to participate in markets where trades are consummated by auctions or in markets where sellers post prices. We show that the selling mechanisms are practically equivalent. Previous studies have shown that auction markets emerge as a unique evolutionary stable equilibrium when compared to bargaining markets. Posted price market dominate bargaining markets similarly.
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Suggested Citation

  • Kultti, K.K., 1997. "Equivalence of Auctions and Posted Prices," Discussion Paper 1997-57, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:fad8afd3-eb42-4a0d-8d60-8ec21401a444
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Wang, Ruqu, 1993. "Auctions versus Posted-Price Selling," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 838-851, September.
    2. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    3. Wang, Ruqu, 1995. "Bargaining versus posted-price selling," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(9), pages 1747-1764, December.
    4. Lu, Xiaohua & McAfee, R. Preston, 1996. "The Evolutionary Stability of Auctions over Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 228-254, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; posted prices; random matching.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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