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A Competitive Partnership Formation Process

Author

Listed:
  • Andersson, T.
  • Gudmundsson, J.
  • Talman, A.J.J.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Yang, Z.

Abstract

A group of heterogeneous agents may form partnerships in pairs. All single agents as well as all partnerships generate values. If two agents choose to cooperate, they need to specify how to split their joint value among one another. In equilibrium, which may or may not exist, no agents have incentives to break up any existing partnerships or form new partnerships. This paper proposes a dynamic competitive adjustment process that always either finds an equilibrium or exclusively disproves the existence of any equilibrium in finitely many steps. When an equilibrium exists, partnership and revenue distribution will be automatically and endogenously determined by the process. Moreover, several fundamental properties of the equilibrium solution and the model are derived.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Andersson, T. & Gudmundsson, J. & Talman, A.J.J. & Yang, Z., 2013. "A Competitive Partnership Formation Process," Discussion Paper 2013-008, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:b5dd75eb-d5be-4788-97b4-fd233c48babc
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

    1. David Pérez-Castrillo & Marilda Sotomayor, 2023. "Constrained-optimal tradewise-stable outcomes in the one-sided assignment game: a solution concept weaker than the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 76(3), pages 963-994, October.
    2. Akiyoshi Shioura, 2017. "On the Partnership formation problem," The Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design, Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design, University of York, vol. 2(1), pages 105-140, December.
    3. Jacob D Leshno & Bary S R Pradelski, 2021. "The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets," Post-Print hal-03100097, HAL.
    4. Gudmundsson, Jens, 2013. "Cycles and Third-Party Payments in the Partnership Formation Problem," Working Papers 2013:16, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    5. Tobias Hiller, 2018. "On the Stability of Couples," Games, MDPI, vol. 9(3), pages 1-10, July.
    6. Andersson, T. & Erlanson, A. & Gudmundsson, J. & Habis, H. & Ingebretsen Carlson, J. & Kratz, J., 2014. "A method for finding the maximal set in excess demand," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 125(1), pages 18-20.
    7. Jens Gudmundsson, 2014. "Sequences in Pairing Problems: A new approach to reconcile stability with strategy-proofness for elementary matching problems," 2014 Papers pgu351, Job Market Papers.
    8. Leshno, Jacob D. & Pradelski, Bary S.R., 2021. "The importance of memory for price discovery in decentralized markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 62-78.
    9. Alejandro Francetich, 2023. "When partner knows best: asymmetric expertise in partnerships," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 52(2), pages 363-399, June.
    10. Manjunath, Vikram, 2016. "Fractional matching markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 321-336.
    11. Ahmet Alkan & Alparslan Tuncay, 2014. "Pairing Games and Markets," Working Papers 2014.48, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Partnership formation; adjustment process; equilibrium; assignment market;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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