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The ascending auction with flexible reporting

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  • Zhang, Xieji

Abstract

In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhang, Xieji, 2024. "The ascending auction with flexible reporting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 132(C), pages 28-39.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:matsoc:v:132:y:2024:i:c:p:28-39
    DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Assignment problem; Unit-demand; Ascending auctions; Flexible reporting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D59 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Other
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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