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Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly

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  • Benchekroun, H.
  • Ray Chaudhuri, A.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

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  • Benchekroun, H. & Ray Chaudhuri, A., 2008. "Collusion Inducing Taxation of a Polluting Oligopoly," Discussion Paper 2008-80, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:90f9c17f-111c-4a4d-a4ab-85138949c7e9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Effrosyni Diamantoudi & Eftichios S. Sartzetakis, 2006. "Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(2), pages 247-263, May.
    2. Stephen W. Salant & Sheldon Switzer & Robert J. Reynolds, 1983. "Losses From Horizontal Merger: The Effects of an Exogenous Change in Industry Structure on Cournot-Nash Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(2), pages 185-199.
    3. Karp, Larry, 1992. "Efficiency Inducing Tax for a Common Property Oligopoly," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 321-332, March.
    4. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
    5. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
    6. Claude d'Aspremont & Alexis Jacquemin & Jean Jaskold Gabszewicz & John A. Weymark, 1983. "On the Stability of Collusive Price Leadership," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(1), pages 17-25, February.
    7. Benchekroun, Hassan & van Long, Ngo, 1998. "Efficiency inducing taxation for polluting oligopolists," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 325-342, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Prieger, James E. & Sanders, Nicholas J., 2012. "Verifiable and non-verifiable anonymous mechanisms for regulating a polluting monopolist," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 64(3), pages 410-426.
    2. Choi, Pak-Sing & Espinola-Arredondo, Ana & Munoz, Felix, 2020. "Mergers as an environmental ally: Socially excessive and insufficient merger approvals," Working Papers 2020-1, School of Economic Sciences, Washington State University.
    3. Choi, Pak-Sing & Espínola-Arredondo, Ana & Muñoz-García, Félix, 2022. "Environmental policy helping antitrust decisions: Socially excessive and insufficient merger approvals," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).

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