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Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements

Author

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  • Nahid Masoudi

    (Memorial University of Newfoundland)

  • Georges Zaccour

    (HEC Montréal)

Abstract

We study the impact of collective effort in R&D in adaptation technologies, and also spillover effects on formation and size of stable international environmental agreements (IEAs). Our results suggest that it is possible to have more than one size of stable IEA. We can achieve a superior equilibrium, i.e., the grand coalition, if countries manage to keep knowledge spillovers low and arrange a minimum ratification threshold. This threshold is defined endogenously. We also shed light on the effects of two-sided spillover on global welfare and the size of stable IEAs.

Suggested Citation

  • Nahid Masoudi & Georges Zaccour, 2018. "Adaptation and International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 71(1), pages 1-21, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:enreec:v:71:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10640-016-0080-9
    DOI: 10.1007/s10640-016-0080-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Nkuiya, Bruno, 2020. "Stability of international environmental agreements under isoelastic utility," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(C).
    3. Schlosser, Rainer & Chenavaz, Régis Y. & Dimitrov, Stanko, 2021. "Circular economy: Joint dynamic pricing and recycling investments," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 236(C).
    4. Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022. "An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
    5. Mao, Liang, 2020. "Designing international environmental agreements under participation uncertainty," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C).
    6. Santiago J. Rubio, 2018. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity," Working Papers 2018.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    7. Gilbert Kollenbach, 2022. "International Environmental Agreements and Black Technology," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(3), pages 601-624, July.
    8. Chiara Donnini & Armando Sacco, 2024. "Social equity in international environmental agreements," Journal of Global Optimization, Springer, vol. 90(1), pages 261-291, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    International environmental agreements; Adaptation technology; Minimum participation clause; Climate change; Knowledge spillover;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • Q50 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - General
    • Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters and their Management; Global Warming
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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