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Foreign direct investment and the political economy of protection

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  • Ellingsen, T.
  • Wärneryd, K.E.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

Abstract

This paper makes the point that an import-competing industry may not want maximal protection. The reason is that a high level of protection encourages inward foreign direct investment, which could be even less desirable than import competition. A government captured by the domestic import-competing industry consequently will set the level of protection low enough to limit direct foreign entry. This paper also establishes results regarding the form of protection. Voluntary export restraints are shown to be the domestic industry's desired means of protection, because leaving export rents with foreigners inhibits foreign direct investment. Copyright 1999 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Suggested Citation

  • Ellingsen, T. & Wärneryd, K.E., 1993. "Foreign direct investment and the political economy of protection," Discussion Paper 1993-8, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:4fb47265-bd68-4322-83b0-b40829b21c28
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    Cited by:

    1. Ronald Davies & Lourenço Paz, 2011. "Tariffs versus VAT in the presence of heterogeneous firms and an informal sector," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 18(5), pages 533-554, October.
    2. Pehr‐Johan Norbäck & Lars Persson, 2005. "Privatization Policy in an International Oligopoly," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 635-653, November.
    3. Bruce A. Blonigen & KaSaundra Tomlin & Wesley W. Wilson, 2019. "Tariff-Jumping FDI and Domestic Firms’ Profits," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foreign Direct Investment, chapter 14, pages 473-500, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Olarreaga, Marcelo, 1999. "Foreign-owned Capital and Endogenous Tariffs," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 14, pages 606-624.
    5. Florence Eid, 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment in The Arab World: Creating The Missing Link," Working Papers 0309, Economic Research Forum, revised Mar 2003.
    6. Bruce Blonigen, 2005. "A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 33(4), pages 383-403, December.
    7. Tadashi Morita & Kouki Sugawara, 2015. "Human capital and FDI: Development process of the developing country in an overlapping generation model," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(7), pages 922-946, October.
    8. Bruce A. Blonigen, 2019. "Tariff-Jumping Antidumping Duties," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Foreign Direct Investment, chapter 5, pages 179-203, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    9. Louis Jaeck & Sehjeong Kim, 2018. "FDI Deregulation Versus Labor Market Reform: a Political Economy Approach," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 46(1), pages 73-89, March.
    10. Jong-Wha Lee & Phillip Swagel, 2000. "Trade Barriers And Trade Flows Across Countries And Industries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 79(3), pages 372-382, August.
    11. Bruce A. Blonigen & Matthew T. Cole, 2011. "Optimal tariffs with FDI : the evidence," Working Papers 201121, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    12. Andreas Polk, 2002. "Lobbying Activities of Multinational Firms," SOI - Working Papers 0205, Socioeconomic Institute - University of Zurich, revised Jun 2002.
    13. Matthew T Cole & Ronald B Davies, 2009. "Optimal Tariffs, Tariff Jumping, and Heterogeneous Firms," Working Papers 200919, School of Economics, University College Dublin.
    14. Palokangas, Tapio K., 2003. "Foreign Direct Investment, Labour Market Regulation and Self-Interested Governments," IZA Discussion Papers 793, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    15. Andréa M. Maechler, 2000. "The Politics of Trade Liberalization in the Presence of FDI Incentives," Working Papers 00.09, Swiss National Bank, Study Center Gerzensee.
    16. Cole, Matthew T. & Davies, Ronald B., 2011. "Strategic tariffs, tariff jumping, and heterogeneous firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 55(4), pages 480-496, May.
    17. Yasukazu Ichino, 2013. "Antidumping Petition, Foreign Direct Investment, and Strategic Exports," Research in World Economy, Research in World Economy, Sciedu Press, vol. 4(1), pages 22-34, March.
    18. Henk Kox & Arjan Lejour & Raymond Montizaan, 2004. "The free movement of services within the EU," CPB Document 69, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.

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    Keywords

    Trade Barriers; Foreign Investment;

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