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Double round-robin tournaments

Author

Listed:
  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    (Department of Economics, University of Verona)

  • Claudia Meroni

    (Department of Economics, University of Verona)

  • Carlos Pimienta

    (School of Economics, UNSW Business School, UNSW)

Abstract

A tournament is a simultaneous n-player game that is built on a two-player game g. We generalize Arad and Rubinstein’s model assuming that every player meets each of his opponents twice to play a (possibly) asymmetric game g in alternating roles (using sports terminology, once "at home" and once "away"). The winner of the tournament is the player who attains the highest total score, which is given by the sum of the payoffs that he gets in all the matches he plays. We explore the relationship between the equilibria of the tournament and the equilibria of the game g. We prove that limit points of equilibria of tournaments as the number of players goes to infinity are equilibria of g. Such a refinement criterion is satisfied by strict equilibria. Being able to analyze arbitrary two-player games allows us to study meaningful economic applications that are not symmetric, such as the ultimatum game.

Suggested Citation

  • Francesco De Sinopoli & Claudia Meroni & Carlos Pimienta, 2016. "Double round-robin tournaments," Discussion Papers 2016-04, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
    • Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2016-04
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    File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2016-04.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
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    3. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-364, June.
    4. Avinash Dixit, 2008. "Strategic Behavior in Contests," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 431-438, Springer.
    5. Christian Groh & Benny Moldovanu & Aner Sela & Uwe Sunde, 2012. "Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 49(1), pages 59-80, January.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    tournaments; asymmetric games; ultimatum game; double round-robin;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General

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