IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/svs/svssdt/2010-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Family Ownership and Firm Performance: A Closer Look at the Evidence from Public Companies in Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Claudio A. Bonilla

    (Universidad del Desarrollo)

  • Mariela Carvajal

    (Universidad de Chile)

  • Jean Sepúlveda

    (Universidad del Desarrollo)

Abstract

We revisit the evidence presented in Martinez et al. (2007) using new data and estimation techniques that take into account unobserved firm heterogeneity. The results of the earlier study are found to be robust to the new procedures since performance of family firms continues to be superior to non-family firms. We then add the risk dimension to the earlier analysis using a risk-adjusted ROA variable, and family firms again performed better. A test of the standard deviations of ROA for both firm categories revealed that family firms not only perform better but also show less volatility in their returns.

Suggested Citation

  • Claudio A. Bonilla & Mariela Carvajal & Jean Sepúlveda, 2010. "Family Ownership and Firm Performance: A Closer Look at the Evidence from Public Companies in Chile," Serie de Documentos de Trabajo 08, Superintendencia de Valores y Seguros.
    • Handle: RePEc:svs:svssdt:2010-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.svs.cl/sitio/publicaciones/doc/Serie%20de%20documentos/doc_trabajo8%20.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mike Burkart & Fausto Panunzi & Andrei Shleifer, 2003. "Family Firms," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(5), pages 2167-2201, October.
    2. Villalonga, Belen & Amit, Raphael, 2006. "How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value?," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 385-417, May.
    3. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    4. Morris, Michael H. & Williams, Roy O. & Allen, Jeffrey A. & Avila, Ramon A., 1997. "Correlates of success in family business transitions," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 12(5), pages 385-401, September.
    5. DeAngelo, Harry & DeAngelo, Linda, 2000. "Controlling stockholders and the disciplinary role of corporate payout policy: a study of the Times Mirror Company," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 153-207, May.
    6. repec:bla:jfinan:v:58:y:2003:i:3:p:1301-1327 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. William S. Schulze & Michael H. Lubatkin & Richard N. Dino & Ann K. Buchholtz, 2001. "Agency Relationships in Family Firms: Theory and Evidence," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 12(2), pages 99-116, April.
    8. Demsetz, Harold, 1983. "The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(2), pages 375-390, June.
    9. Rafael Romero-Meza & Claudio Bonilla & Melvin Hinich, 2007. "Nonlinear event detection in the Chilean stock market," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(13), pages 987-991.
    10. Ronald C. Anderson & David M. Reeb, 2003. "Founding‐Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S&P 500," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(3), pages 1301-1328, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Mike Peng & Yi Jiang, 2006. "Family Ownership And Control In Large Firms: The Good, The Bad, The Irrelevant ??? And Why," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp840, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    2. Ahrens, Jan-Philipp & Uhlaner, Lorraine & Woywode, Michael & Zybura, Jan, 2018. "“Shadow emperor” or “loyal paladin”? – The Janus face of previous owner involvement in family firm successions," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 73-90.
    3. Jan-Philipp Ahrens & Andrea Calabrò & Jolien Huybrechts & Michael Woywode, 2019. "The Enigma of the Family Successor–Firm Performance Relationship: A Methodological Reflection and Reconciliation Attempt," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 43(3), pages 437-474, May.
    4. Isabelle Le Breton-Miller & Danny Miller, 2009. "Agency vs. Stewardship in Public Family Firms: A Social Embeddedness Reconciliation," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 33(6), pages 1169-1191, November.
    5. Wenyi Chu, 2011. "Family ownership and firm performance: Influence of family management, family control, and firm size," Asia Pacific Journal of Management, Springer, vol. 28(4), pages 833-851, December.
    6. Chen, Chao-Jung & Hsu, Chung-Yuan & Chen, Yu-Lin, 2014. "The impact of family control on the top management compensation mix and incentive orientation," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 32(C), pages 29-46.
    7. Mauricio Jara-Bertin & Jean P. Sepulveda, 2014. "Earnings Management and Performance in Family-Controlled Firms:Evidence from an Emerging Economy," Serie Working Papers 01, Universidad del Desarrollo, School of Business and Economics, revised Nov 2014.
    8. Hamadi, Malika & Heinen, Andréas, 2015. "Firm performance when ownership is very concentrated: Evidence from a semiparametric panel," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 172-194.
    9. Christoph Kaserer & Benjamin Moldenhauer, 2008. "Insider ownership and corporate performance: evidence from Germany," Review of Managerial Science, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, March.
    10. Isakov, Dušan & Weisskopf, Jean-Philippe, 2014. "Are founding families special blockholders? An investigation of controlling shareholder influence on firm performance," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 1-16.
    11. King, Roger & Peng, Winnie Qian, 2013. "The effect of industry characteristics on the control longevity of founding-family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 281-295.
    12. Block, Joern H. & Jaskiewicz, Peter & Miller, Danny, 2011. "Ownership versus management effects on performance in family and founder companies: A Bayesian reconciliation," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 232-245.
    13. Miller, Danny & Le Breton-Miller, Isabelle & Lester, Richard H. & Cannella Jr., Albert A., 2007. "Are family firms really superior performers?," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(5), pages 829-858, December.
    14. Wang, Kun Tracy & Shailer, Greg, 2017. "Family ownership and financial performance relations in emerging markets," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 82-98.
    15. Richard H. Lester & Albert A. Cannella Jr., 2006. "Interorganizational Familiness: How Family Firms Use Interlocking Directorates to Build Community–Level Social Capital1," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 30(6), pages 755-775, November.
    16. Patrice Charlier & Céline Du Boys, 2009. "Gouvernance Familiale Et Repartition De La Valeur : Etude Des Politiques De Distribution Aux Actionnaires Des Entreprises Familiales Cotees," Post-Print halshs-00455729, HAL.
    17. Pindado, Julio & Requejo, Ignacio & de la Torre, Chabela, 2014. "Family control, expropriation, and investor protection: A panel data analysis of Western European corporations," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 58-74.
    18. Lious Agbor Tabot Ntoung & Helena Maria Santos de Oliveira & Benjamim Manuel Ferreira de Sousa & Liliana Marques Pimentel & Susana Adelina Moreira Carvalho Bastos, 2019. "Are Family Firms Financially Healthier Than Non-Family Firm?," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 13(1), pages 1-18, December.
    19. Malika Hamadi & Ronald W. Anderson, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," LSF Research Working Paper Series 09-04, Luxembourg School of Finance, University of Luxembourg.
    20. Anderson, Ronald & Hamadi, Malika, 2009. "Large powerful shareholders and cash holding," CEPR Discussion Papers 7291, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Family firms; performance.;

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:svs:svssdt:2010-8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/svsgvcl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.