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The Macroeconomic Effects of Official Debt Restructuring: Evidence from the Paris Club

Author

Listed:
  • Gong Cheng

    (European Stability Mechanism)

  • Javier Diaz-Cassou

    (iadb.org)

  • Aitor Erce

    (European Stability Mechanism)

Abstract

This paper presents new empirical results on the macroeconomic impact of sovereign debt restructurings with official-sector creditors. Using a novel dataset on Paris Club restructurings and Local Projection methods, we find that Paris Club treatments can have a significant impact on economic growth -- 2% higher GDP growth two years after the restructuring -- when a nominal haircut is provided. At the same time, the countries that had received nominal debt relief tend to be less prudent in conducting their fiscal policy than those benefiting from a restructuring in NPV terms. Furthermore, as regards the external sector adjustment after debt restructuring, we observe an improvement in the net foreign asset position, due to the combination of less external debt and higher foreign reserves. Our study suggests that the official sector faces some short-term trade-offs between the objectives of stimulating economic growth, promoting fiscal prudence and improving a country's position in international capital markets when designing a debt restructuring.

Suggested Citation

  • Gong Cheng & Javier Diaz-Cassou & Aitor Erce, 2016. "The Macroeconomic Effects of Official Debt Restructuring: Evidence from the Paris Club," Working Papers 21, European Stability Mechanism, revised 24 Apr 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:stm:wpaper:21
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    Cited by:

    1. Valentin Lang & David Mihalyi & Andrea F. Presbitero, 2023. "Borrowing Costs after Sovereign Debt Relief," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 331-358, May.
    2. Gatien Bon & Gong Cheng, 2021. "Understanding China's role in recent debt relief operations: A case study analysis," International Economics, CEPII research center, issue 166, pages 23-41.
    3. Gatien Bon & Gong Cheng, 2020. "China’s debt relief actions overseas and macroeconomic implications," EconomiX Working Papers 2020-27, University of Paris Nanterre, EconomiX.
    4. Tamon Asonuma & Marcos Chamon & Aitor Erce & Akira Sasahara, 2019. "Costs of sovereign defaults: Restructuring strategies, bank distress and the capital inflow-credit channel," Working Papers 37, European Stability Mechanism.
    5. Christophe Destais & Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "The design of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area: Choices and trade-offs," CEPII Policy Brief 2019-25, CEPII research center.
    6. Sebastian Horn & Carmen M. Reinhart & Christoph Trebesch, 2022. "Hidden Defaults," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 531-535, May.
    7. Elard, Ilaf, 2020. "Three-player sovereign debt negotiations," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 217-240.
    8. Marchesi, Silvia & Masi, Tania, 2021. "Life after default. Private and official deals," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 113(C).
    9. Mark Wright, 2018. "The Seniority Structure of Sovereign Debt," 2018 Meeting Papers 928, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    10. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2019. "Sovereign risk after sovereign restructuring. Private and official default," Working Papers 423, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2019.
    11. Baqir, Reza & Diwan, Ishac & Rodrik, Dani, 2023. "Dealing with the new wave of debt overhangs: A Framework to Evaluate Economic Adjustment-Cum-Debt Restructuring Packages," FDL Policy Notes 2301, CEPREMAP.
    12. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi, 2020. "The price of haircuts: private and official default," Development Working Papers 460, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 06 Feb 2020.
    13. Silvia Marchesi & Tania Masi & Pietro Bomprezzi, 2021. "Is to Forgive to Forget? Sovereign Risk in the Aftermath of a Default," Development Working Papers 475, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano.
    14. Silvia Marchesi, 2016. "Life after default? Private vs. official sovereign debt restructurings," Development Working Papers 398, Centro Studi Luca d'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 26 Aug 2016.
    15. Graf von Luckner, Clemens M. & Meyer, Josefin & Reinhart, Carmen M. & Trebesch, Christoph, 2024. "Sovereign haircuts: 200 years of creditor losses," Kiel Working Papers 2270, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    16. Frederik Eidam & Friedrich Heinemann, 2019. "Towards more feasible sovereign debt restructurings in the euro area," EconPol Policy Reports 12, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    17. Flavia Corneli, 2024. "Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 31(1), pages 262-297, February.
    18. Cheng, Gong & Díaz-Cassou, Javier & Erce, Aitor, 2018. "Official debt restructurings and development," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 181-195.
    19. Sayantan Ghosal & Marcus Miller, 2019. "Introduction to the special issue on sovereign debt restructuring," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 71(2), pages 309-319.
    20. Calomiris, Charles W. & Tsoulouhas, Theofanis, 2022. "Bailing out conflicted sovereigns," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Official Creditors; Sovereign Debt Restructuring; Growth; Fiscal Stance; External Sector Adjustment; Local Projections;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C53 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Forecasting and Prediction Models; Simulation Methods
    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt

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