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The Dynamics of a Behavioral Two-Sex Demographic Model

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Abstract

In this paper, we examine the dynamic properties of a particular demographic model. An essential part of the model is the marriage function which is derived from assumptions about the behavior of women and men in a market where each individual is looking for a suitable partner. By means of simulation experiments we investigate different aspects of the model. Specifically, we find that it is difficult to determine parameters related to preferences, birth and death rates, such that a non-trivial stable equilibrium is attained.

Suggested Citation

  • Rune Johansen & John K. Dagsvik, 1999. "The Dynamics of a Behavioral Two-Sex Demographic Model," Discussion Papers 247, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssb:dispap:247
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    File URL: https://www.ssb.no/a/publikasjoner/pdf/DP/dp247.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pollak, Robert A, 1990. "Two-Sex Demographic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(2), pages 399-420, April.
    2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1992. "Two-sided matching," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 16, pages 485-541, Elsevier.
    3. John K. Dagsvik & Ane S. Flaatten & Helge Brunborg, 1998. "A Behavioral Two-Sex Marriage Model," Discussion Papers 238, Statistics Norway, Research Department.
    4. Dagsvik, John K, 2000. "Aggregation in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(1), pages 27-57, February.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Two-sex demographic models; Marriage function; Birth rates; Non-trivial equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • J11 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Demographic Trends, Macroeconomic Effects, and Forecasts

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