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Understanding an Emergent Diversity of Corporate Governance and Organizational Architecture: An Essentiality-Based Analysis

Author

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  • Masahiko Aoki

    (Economics Department, Stanford University)

Abstract

This article proposes a simple framework for understanding diversity of linkages between corporate governance (CG) and organizational architecture (OA). It distinguishes discreet modes of their linkage by different combinatorial patterns between three basic assets: managers’ human assets (MHA), workers’ human assets (WHA), and non-human assets (NHA). Using the concept of essentiality of human assets proposed by Hart (1995) and distinguished from that of complementarities, we first propose a new characterization of four known modes of CG-OA linkage: three traditional (Anglo-American, German, and Japanese) and one relatively new (Silicon Valley) models. Then we present empirical evidence of emergent diversity of CG-OA linkages in Japan, which is somewhat at odds with the old Japanese model. We interpret its emergent dominant mode as the path-dependent evolution of a new pattern of essentiality between human assets, made viable by lessening of institutional-complementarity-constraints which surrounded the traditional Japanese model. We argue that this new mode interpreted in terms of essentiality may have broader applicability beyond Japanese context.

Suggested Citation

  • Masahiko Aoki, 2007. "Understanding an Emergent Diversity of Corporate Governance and Organizational Architecture: An Essentiality-Based Analysis," Discussion Papers 07-019, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:sip:dpaper:07-019
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corporate governance; essentiality; human assets; institutional change; organizational architecture; path dependence;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Language; Social and Economic Stratification

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