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Micro-Finance and Poverty Alleviation Issues Relating to NGO Programmes in South India

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  • D Rajasekhar

    (Institute for social and Economic Change)

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • D Rajasekhar, 2004. "Micro-Finance and Poverty Alleviation Issues Relating to NGO Programmes in South India," Working Papers 146, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore.
  • Handle: RePEc:sch:wpaper:146
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    File URL: http://www.isec.ac.in/WP%20-%20146.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dasgupta, Rajaram, 2001. "An Informal Journey through Self-Help Groups," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 56(3), September.
    2. Ghatak, Maitreesh, 1999. "Group lending, local information and peer selection," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 27-50, October.
    3. Datta, Samar K. & Raman, M., 2001. "Can Heterogenity and Social Cohesion Coexist in Self-Help Groups?: An Evidence from Group Lending in Andhra Pradesh in India," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 56(3), September.
    4. Satish, P., 2001. "Some Issues in the Formation of Self-Help Groups," Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics, Indian Society of Agricultural Economics, vol. 56(3), September.
    5. Jonathan Morduch, 1999. "The Microfinance Promise," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 37(4), pages 1569-1614, December.
    6. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Savings, credit and insurance," Handbook of Development Economics, in: Hollis Chenery & T.N. Srinivasan (ed.), Handbook of Development Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2123-2207, Elsevier.
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1990. "Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 4(3), pages 351-366, September.
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