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Compulsory versus voluntary savings as an incentive mechanism in microfinance programs

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  • Olivier Bruno

    (GREDEG - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion - UNS - Université Nice Sophia Antipolis (1965 - 2019) - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - UniCA - Université Côte d'Azur)

  • Knar Khachatryan

    (American University of Armenia)

Abstract

This paper investigates the incentive mechanism of individual microlending contracts focusing particularly on microsavings. We built a model to show the role of compulsory and voluntary microsavings in addressing problems of information asymmetries. Our results are twofold. First, we show that compulsory savings creates incentive conditions required for allowing micro-entrepreneurs to be financed by a Microfinance institution. Second, we show that voluntary savings can serve as a complementary tool to repayment enforcement at the same time inducing borrowers to reveal abilities of their projects.

Suggested Citation

  • Olivier Bruno & Knar Khachatryan, 2020. "Compulsory versus voluntary savings as an incentive mechanism in microfinance programs," Post-Print halshs-03418177, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-03418177
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jbef.2020.100317
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    Cited by:

    1. Laureti, Carolina & Szafarz, Ariane, 2023. "Banking regulation and costless commitment contracts for time-inconsistent agents," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Microfinance; Compulsory microsavings; Voluntary microsavings; Incentive mechanism; Repayment enforcement Screening;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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