Does Subsidising the Cost of Capital Help the Poorest? An Analysis of Saving Opportunities in Group Lending
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Cited by:
- Beatriz Armendáriz & Ariane Szafarz, 2011.
"On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Beatriz Armendáriz & Marc Labie (ed.), The Handbook Of Microfinance, chapter 16, pages 341-366,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Beatriz Armendariz & Ariane Szafarz, 2009. "On Mission Drift In Microfinance Institutions," Working Papers CEB 09-015.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Beatriz Armendariz & Ariane Szafarz, 2011. "On Mission Drift in Microfinance Institutions," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/97387, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Armendáriz, Beatriz & Szafarz, Ariane, 2011. "On mission drift in microfinance institutions," MPRA Paper 31041, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 2010.
- Roy, Jaideep & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2009.
"Public-private partnerships in micro-finance: Should NGO involvement be restricted?,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(2), pages 200-208, November.
- Roy Chowdhury, Prabal & Roy, Jaideep, 2007. "Public-private Partnerships in Micro-finance: Should NGO Involvement be Restricted?," MPRA Paper 4469, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Jaideep Roy & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2008. "Public-private partnerships in microfinance: Should NGO involvement be restricted?," Discussion Papers 08-11, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.
- Koen Rossel-Cambier, 2011. "Is Combined Microfinance an Instrument to enhance Sustainable Pro-Poor Public Policy Outcomes?," Working Papers CEB 11-013, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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More about this item
Keywords
group-lending; microfinance; savings; outreach; wealth;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
- O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
- O2 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CFN-2006-03-05 (Corporate Finance)
- NEP-DEV-2006-03-05 (Development)
- NEP-FIN-2006-03-05 (Finance)
- NEP-MFD-2006-03-05 (Microfinance)
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