Models of Cross-Border VAT Fraud
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Sokolovska, Olena, 2016. "Cross-border VAT frauds and measures to tackle them," MPRA Paper 70504, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Martin T. Braml & Gabriel J. Felbermayr, 2022.
"The EU self-surplus puzzle: an indication of VAT fraud?,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(5), pages 1075-1097, October.
- Braml, Martin & Felbermayr, Gabriel, 2019. "The EU self-surplus puzzle: An indication of VAT fraud?," Kiel Working Papers 2146, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Martin T. Braml & Gabriel J. Felbermary & Gabriel J. Felbermayr, 2019. "The EU Self-Surplus Puzzle: An Indication of VAT Fraud?," CESifo Working Paper Series 7982, CESifo.
- Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2011.
"EU VAT frauds,"
European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 31(2), pages 143-166, April.
- Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2009. "EU VAT Frauds," Working Papers in Public Economics 129, Department of Economics and Law, Sapienza University of Roma.
- Maria-Augusta Miceli, 2020. "VAT Compliance Incentives," Papers 2002.07862, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2021.
- Antonio Gómez Gómez-Plana & Pedro Pascual Arzoz, 2011. "Fraude fiscal e IVA en España: incidencia en un modelo de equilibrio general," Hacienda Pública Española / Review of Public Economics, IEF, vol. 199(4), pages 9-52, December.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Silvia Fedeli & Francesco Forte, 2012. "Border Tax Adjustment without Borders: The EU Carousel of VAT Fraud," Review of Economics & Finance, Better Advances Press, Canada, vol. 2, pages 55-70, November.
- Gauthier, Bernard & Goyette, Jonathan & Kouamé, Wilfried A.K., 2021.
"Why do firms pay bribes? Evidence on the demand and supply sides of corruption in developing countries,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 463-479.
- Gauthier,Bernard P. & Goyette,Jonathan & Kouame,Wilfried Anicet Kouakou, 2020. "Why Do Firms Pay Bribes? : Evidence on the Demand and Supply Sides of Corruption in Developing Countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9441, The World Bank.
- Fadi KANSO, 2008. "Wages and Penalties in Fighting Hierarchical Corruption (Tax Administration Case)," EcoMod2008 23800055, EcoMod.
- Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2016.
"Fiscal policy and corruption,"
Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 57-79, January.
- Bernard Gauthier & Jonathan Goyette, 2012. "Fiscal policy and corruption," Cahiers de recherche 12-09, Departement d'économique de l'École de gestion à l'Université de Sherbrooke.
- Bernard Gauthier & Jean-Paul Azam & Jonathan Goyette, 2004. "The Effect of Fiscal Policy and Corruption Control Mechanisms on Firm Growth and Social Welfare: Theory and Evidence," Cahiers de recherche 04-10, HEC Montréal, Institut d'économie appliquée.
- Jan U. Auerbach, 2019. "Property rights enforcement with unverifiable incomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(3), pages 701-735, October.
- Fadi KANSO, 2007. "Wages and Sanctions against Hierarchical Corruption," CAE Working Papers 51, Aix-Marseille Université, CERGAM.
- Sanyal, Amal, 2000. "Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 364-378, June.
- Fedeli, Silvia & Forte, Francesco, 1999. "Joint income-tax and VAT-chain evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 391-415, September.
- Makowsky, Michael D. & Wang, Siyu, 2018. "Embezzlement, whistleblowing, and organizational architecture: An experimental investigation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 147(C), pages 58-75.
- Taliercio, Robert Jr., 2004. "Administrative Reform as Credible Commitment: The Impact of Autonomy on Revenue Authority Performance in Latin America," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 213-232, February.
- Torgler, Benno & Schneider, Friedrich & Schaltegger, Christoph A., 2007.
"With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy,"
Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series
qt6331x6vz, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
- Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider & Christoph A. Schaltegger, 2007. "With or Against the People? The Impact of a Bottom-Up Approach on Tax Morale and the Shadow Economy," CREMA Working Paper Series 2007-04, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Puklavec, Žiga & Kogler, Christoph & Stavrova, Olga & Zeelenberg, Marcel, 2023. "What we tweet about when we tweet about taxes: A topic modelling approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 1242-1254.
- Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
- Cyril Chalendard, 2015.
"Use of internal information, external information acquisition and customs underreporting,"
Working Papers
halshs-01179445, HAL.
- Cyril CHALENDARD, 2015. "Use of Internal Information, External Information Acquisition and Customs Underreporting," Working Papers 201522, CERDI.
- Blackburn, Keith & Forgues-Puccio, Gonzalo F., 2009.
"Why is corruption less harmful in some countries than in others?,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 797-810, December.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2007. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Centre for Growth and Business Cycle Research Discussion Paper Series 88, Economics, The University of Manchester.
- Keith Blackburn & Gonzalo F. Forgues-Puccio, 2009. "Why is Corruption Less Harmful in Some Countries Than in Others?," Post-Print hal-00725353, HAL.
- Arun Advani & William Elming & Jonathan Shaw, 2023.
"The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 105(3), pages 545-561, May.
- Arun Advani & William Elming & Jonathan Shaw, 2017. "The dynamic effects of tax audits," IFS Working Papers W17/24, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Advani, Arun & Elming, William & Shaw, Jonathan, 2019. "The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 414, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- Advani, Arun & Elming, William & Shaw, Jonathan, 2019. "The Dynamic Effects of Tax Audits," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 1198, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- repec:ebl:ecbull:v:15:y:2004:i:1:p:1-10 is not listed on IDEAS
- Colin C. Williams, 2023. "A Modern Guide to the Informal Economy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 18668.
- Fábio Pereira Silva & Reinaldo Guerreiro & Eduardo Flores, 2019. "Voluntary versus enforced tax compliance: the slippery slope framework in the Brazilian context," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 66(2), pages 147-180, June.
- Friedrich Heinemann & Martin Kocher, 2013.
"Tax compliance under tax regime changes,"
International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(2), pages 225-246, April.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2010. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," ZEW Discussion Papers 10-020, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2010. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," Discussion Papers in Economics 11443, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Heinemann, Friedrich & Kocher, Martin G., 2013. "Tax compliance under tax regime changes," Munich Reprints in Economics 18179, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
More about this item
Keywords
European Union Value Added Tax; income tax and VAT evasion; VAT carousel; Nash equilibrium fraud-chain;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sap:wpaper:wp123. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Luisa Giuriato (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://ecodir.web.uniroma1.it/ .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.