Audit Hierarchy in a Corrupt Tax Administration
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References listed on IDEAS
- Srinivasan, T. N., 1973. "Tax evasion: A model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(4), pages 339-346.
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Cited by:
- repec:bla:econom:v:71:y:2004:i::p:155-168 is not listed on IDEAS
- Laszlo Goerke, 2008.
"Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion,"
Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 177-196, May.
- Laszlo Goerke, 2006. "Bureaucratic Corruption and Profit Tax Evasion," CESifo Working Paper Series 1666, CESifo.
- Amal Sanyal, 2000. "Bribes for Faster Delivery," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 474.00, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
- Michal Karas, 2012. "Tax rate to maximize the revenue: Laffer curve for the Czech Republic," Acta Universitatis Agriculturae et Silviculturae Mendelianae Brunensis, Mendel University Press, vol. 60(4), pages 189-194.
- Wilson, John K. & Damania, Richard, 2005. "Corruption, political competition and environmental policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 49(3), pages 516-535, May.
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