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The Political Economy Of Kosher Wars

Author

Listed:
  • Ira N. Gang

    (Rutgers University)

  • Gil S. Epstein

    (Bar Ilan University)

Abstract

In this paper we develop a theory of Kosher Wars under which Rabbis (certifying authorities) compete to enhance the level of Jewish observation of their congregations. The level of observance can be seen as the Rabbi's rents. Our rent-seeking model explains the establishment of Kashrut standards, first with European style community control under a single Rabbi, and then under America's voluntary structure with the possibility of competing Rabbis.

Suggested Citation

  • Ira N. Gang & Gil S. Epstein, 2002. "The Political Economy Of Kosher Wars," Departmental Working Papers 200227, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:rut:rutres:200227
    as

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    File URL: http://www.sas.rutgers.edu/virtual/snde/wp/2002-27.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1989. "Politically Contestable Rents And Transfers," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 1(1), pages 17-39, March.
    2. Jack Hirshleifer, 1989. "Conflict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio vs. difference models of relative success," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Arye L. Hillman & Kai A. Konrad (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, pages 251-262, Springer.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. John Lever & James S Vandeventer & Mara Miele, 2023. "The ontological politics of kosher food: Between strict orthodoxy and global markets," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 55(2), pages 255-273, March.
    2. Jan Myslivecek, 2008. "How to Price Imperfect Certification," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp364, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.
    3. Edwin Dickens, 1998. "Bank Influence and the Failure of US Monetary Policy during the 1953-54 Recession," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(2), pages 221-240.
    4. Hein, Eckhard, 2002. "Monetary policy and wage bargaining in the EMU: Restrictive ECB policies, high unemployment, nominal wage restraint and rising inflation," WSI Working Papers 103, The Institute of Economic and Social Research (WSI), Hans Böckler Foundation.
    5. Hugh Campbell & Anne Murcott & Angela MacKenzie, 2011. "Kosher in New York City, halal in Aquitaine: challenging the relationship between neoliberalism and food auditing," Agriculture and Human Values, Springer;The Agriculture, Food, & Human Values Society (AFHVS), vol. 28(1), pages 67-79, February.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    dietary restrictions; Kashrut; kosher; religion; rent-seeking;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • Z12 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Religion

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