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Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis

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Abstract

We set up an experimental coordination game among bank depositors à la Diamond and Dybvig (1983). We elicit subjects’ financial literacy and study the impact of revealing this information on the coordination problem typical of this game with multiple equilibria. We find that when no information is revealed the likelihood of runs increases with bank size, while when information on financial literacy is disclosed it increases in small banks and decreases in large ones. Over all banks’ dimensions, the probability of coordinating on the inefficient equilibrium is lower when the average financial literacy revealed to the group is higher.

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  • Eloisa Campioni & Vittorio Larocca & Loredana Mirra & Luca Panaccione, 2017. "Financial literacy and bank runs: an experimental analysis," CEIS Research Paper 402, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 07 Jul 2017.
    • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:402
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    Cited by:

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      • Hubert J. Kiss & Ismael Rodriguez-Lara & Alfonso Rosa-Garcia, 2021. "Experimental Bank Runs," ThE Papers 21/03, Department of Economic Theory and Economic History of the University of Granada..
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank Run; Laboratory Experiment; Financial Literacy; Coordination Game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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