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An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions

Author

Listed:
  • Chakravarty, Surajeet
  • Fonseca, Miguel A.
  • Kaplan, Todd R.

Abstract

To understand the mechanisms behind bank run contagions, we conduct bank run experiments in a modified Diamond–Dybvig setup with two banks (Left and Right). The banks׳ liquidity levels are either linked or independent. Left Bank depositors see their bank׳s liquidity level before deciding. Right Bank depositors only see Left Bank withdrawals before deciding. We find that Left Bank depositors׳ actions significantly affect Right Bank depositors׳ behavior, even when liquidities are independent. Furthermore, a panic may be a one-way street: an increase in Left Bank withdrawals can cause a panic run on the Right Bank, but a decrease does not calm depositors.

Suggested Citation

  • Chakravarty, Surajeet & Fonseca, Miguel A. & Kaplan, Todd R., 2014. "An experiment on the causes of bank run contagions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 39-51.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:72:y:2014:i:c:p:39-51
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.09.003
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank runs; Contagion; Experiments; Multiple equilibria;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection

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