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Diagnostics of Economic Growth in Russia
[Диагностика Экономического Роста В России]

Author

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  • Gvozdeva, Margarita (Гвоздева, Маргарита)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Kazakova, Maria V. (Казакова, Мария)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

Abstract

The work uses the Rodrik-Hausman-Velasco-Klinger-Wagner approach to determine the sequence of reforms in the Russian economy. The approach was developed at Harvard University's Center for International Development and consists of consistently identifying the reasons for the lack of investment in the economy and insufficiently high rates of economic growth. The approach is characterized by a variety of methods used to answer questions about the causes of economic slowdown: from modern econometric and algebraic methods to interviews with experts. Similar plans for reform have already been created for a large number of developing countries, but such a plan has not been met for Russia. The creation of such a plan, in particular, will strengthen the argumentation in expert disputes about which reforms are needed in Russia in the first place, and what transformations or measures of state policy are premature and even counterproductive. Thus, the result of this work will be the identification of the most stringent restrictions that restrain economic growth and the drawing up of a sequence of reforms for the Russian economy.

Suggested Citation

  • Gvozdeva, Margarita (Гвоздева, Маргарита) & Kazakova, Maria V. (Казакова, Мария), 2018. "Diagnostics of Economic Growth in Russia [Диагностика Экономического Роста В России]," Working Papers 031828, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
    • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:031828
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    References listed on IDEAS

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