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But Who Will Guard the Guardians?

Author

Listed:
  • Hurwicz, Leonid

    (University of Minnesota)

Abstract

A pre-recorded version of Leonid Hurwicz' Prize Lecture was presented on 8 December 2007 at Aula Magna, Stockholm University. The lecture was introduced by Professor Jorgen Weibull, Chairman of the Economics Prize Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Hurwicz, Leonid, 2007. "But Who Will Guard the Guardians?," Nobel Prize in Economics documents 2007-3, Nobel Prize Committee.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:nobelp:2007_003
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    File URL: http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/2007/hurwicz-lecture.html
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Groves, Theodore & Ledyard, John O, 1977. "Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 45(4), pages 783-809, May.
    2. Calsamiglia, Xavier, 1977. "Decentralized resource allocation and increasing returns," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 263-283, April.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mechanism design;

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact

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