IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ris/enedoc/0010.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Conducta electoral oportunista y determinantes económicos de la reelección de alcaldes/as en Chile

Author

Listed:
  • Silva-Escobar, Daniel

    (Estudios Nueva Economía)

Abstract

En este documento ofrecemos respuesta a la pregunta acerca de si los/as alcaldes/as chilenos/as llevaron a cabo manipulaciones oportunistas del gasto durante el periodo 2009-2012, y si dicho comportamiento fue o no premiado por los/as votantes. Los principales resultados a los que llegamos son: i) no existió una conducta oportunista generalizada de parte de los/as alcaldes/as con respecto a la mayoría de los ítems presupuestarios, aunque casi la mitad de los/as mismos/as llevó a cabo manipulaciones de este talante; ii) la gran mayoría se comportó oportunistamente en cuanto al gasto social, incrementándolo considerablemente durante los dos últimos años de mandato; iii) el electorado chileno castigó a los/as alcaldes/as que más gastaron en las categorías de gastos totales y gastos corrientes, pero premió a aquellos/as que fueron más dispendiosos/as en cuanto a gastos sociales; y, finalmente, iv) a mayor cantidad de pobreza comunal, mayor el grado de recompensa de los/as alcaldes/as que gastaron más en el área social. Sostenemos que, en vista de la pobreza y vulnerabilidad de amplias capas de la población chilena, y dada la amplia extensión del clientelismo/patronazgo en los municipios del país, se debe terminar con la discrecionalidad en la entrega de ayudas sociales municipales.

Suggested Citation

  • Silva-Escobar, Daniel, 2022. "Conducta electoral oportunista y determinantes económicos de la reelección de alcaldes/as en Chile," Documentos de Trabajo 10, Estudios Nueva Economía.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:enedoc:0010
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://estudiosnuevaeconomia.cl/wp-content/uploads/ene/2022/01/DT-Daniel-Silva-Escobar-versi%C3%B3n-final.pdf
    File Function: Full text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Leonardo Letelier S., 2011. "Theory and evidence of municipal borrowing in Chile," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 395-411, March.
    2. Sáez-Lozano, José Luis. & Jaime-Castillo, Antonio M. & Letelier, Leonardo, 2014. "Voto económico con incertidumbre. El caso de Chile," El Trimestre Económico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, vol. 0(324), pages .809-837, octubre-d.
    3. Adi Brender & Allan Drazen, 2008. "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Panel of Countries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(5), pages 2203-2220, December.
    4. Ernesto Stein, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 2, pages 357-391, November.
    5. Akhmed Akhmedov & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1301-1338.
    6. Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
    7. Lucie Sedmihradská & Rudolf Kubík & Jakub Haas, 2011. "Political Business Cycle in Czech Municipalities," Prague Economic Papers, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2011(1), pages 59-70.
    8. Rodrigo Cerda & Rodrigo Vergara, 2007. "Business cycle and political election outcomes: Evidence from the Chilean democracy," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 125-136, July.
    9. Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
    10. Stephan Litschig & Kevin Morrison, 2010. "Government spending and re-election: Quasi-experimental evidence from Brazilian municipalities," Economics Working Papers 1233, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2012.
    11. Ernesto Stein, 1999. "Fiscal Decentralization and Government Size in Latin America," Journal of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 2(2), pages 357-391, November.
    12. Schultz, Kenneth A., 1995. "The Politics of the Political Business Cycle," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(1), pages 79-99, January.
    13. Francisca Pacheco & Rafael Sánchez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2021. "Estimating local government efficiency using a panel data parametric approach: the case of Chilean municipalities," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 53(3), pages 292-314, January.
    14. Sergio Sakurai & Naercio Menezes-Filho, 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 301-314, October.
    15. Drazen, Allan & Eslava, Marcela, 2010. "Electoral manipulation via voter-friendly spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(1), pages 39-52, May.
    16. Labonne, Julien, 2016. "Local political business cycles: Evidence from Philippine municipalities," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 56-62.
    17. Ronald Kneebone & Kenneth McKenzie, 2001. "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 8(5), pages 753-774, November.
    18. Velibor Mackic, 2014. "Political budget cycles at the municipal level in Croatia," Financial Theory and Practice, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 38(1), pages 1-35.
    19. Balaguer-Coll, María Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel, 2013. "El efecto del gasto público sobre las posibilidades de reelección de los gobiernos locales," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 74-80.
    20. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2006. "Pork Barrel Cycles," NBER Working Papers 12190, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    21. Rogoff, Kenneth, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 21-36, March.
    22. Balaguer-Coll, Maria Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel & Forte, Anabel & Tortosa-Ausina, Emili, 2015. "Local governments' re-election and its determinants: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 94-108.
    23. Slaven Razmilic, 2015. "Impuesto territorial y financiamiento municipal," Estudios Públicos, Centro de Estudios Públicos, vol. 0(138), pages 47-92.
    24. Cassette, Aurélie & Farvaque, Etienne, 2014. "Are elections debt brakes? Evidence from French municipalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(2), pages 314-316.
    25. Olejnik Łukasz Wiktor, 2019. "Local Political Business Cycles and Administration Spending in Polish Local Governments," Economic and Regional Studies / Studia Ekonomiczne i Regionalne, Sciendo, vol. 12(2), pages 187-199, June.
    26. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vasileios & Papandreou, Andreas A., 2016. "Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-13.
    27. Sakurai, Sergio N. & Menezes, Naercio A., 2008. "Fiscal policy and reelection in Brazilian municipalities," Insper Working Papers wpe_117, Insper Working Paper, Insper Instituto de Ensino e Pesquisa.
    28. Cerda, Rodrigo & Vergara, Rodrigo, 2008. "Government Subsidies and Presidential Election Outcomes: Evidence for a Developing Country," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 36(11), pages 2470-2488, November.
    29. Niskanen, William A, 1975. "Bureaucrats and Politicians," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 617-643, December.
    30. Allan Drazen & Marcela Eslava, 2005. "Electoral Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 11085, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    31. Jeroen Klomp & Jakob Haan, 2013. "Political budget cycles and election outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(1), pages 245-267, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. García, Israel & Hayo, Bernd, 2021. "Political budget cycles revisited: Testing the signalling process," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Balaguer-Coll, Maria Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel & Forte, Anabel & Tortosa-Ausina, Emili, 2015. "Local governments' re-election and its determinants: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 94-108.
    3. Maria Teresa Balaguer-Coll & María Isabel Brun-Martos & Anabel Forte & Emili Tortosa-Ausina, 2014. "Determinants of local governments'­ reelection: New evidence based on a Bayesian approach," Working Papers 2014/06, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    4. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01320586, HAL.
    5. Antoine CAZALS & Pierre MANDON, 2016. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation from Leaders or Manipulation from Researchers? Evidence from a Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers 201609, CERDI.
    6. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," CERDI Working papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    7. Chortareas, Georgios & Logothetis, Vasileios & Papandreou, Andreas A., 2016. "Political budget cycles and reelection prospects in Greece's municipalities," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-13.
    8. Antoine Cazals & Pierre Mandon, 2015. "Political Budget Cycles: Manipulation of Leaders or Bias from Research? A Meta-Regression Analysis," Working Papers halshs-01238883, HAL.
    9. Balaguer-Coll, María Teresa & Brun-Martos, María Isabel, 2013. "El efecto del gasto público sobre las posibilidades de reelección de los gobiernos locales," Revista de Contabilidad - Spanish Accounting Review, Elsevier, vol. 16(1), pages 74-80.
    10. Stéphane Goutte & David Guerreiro & Bilel Sanhaji & Sophie Saglio & Julien Chevallier, 2019. "International Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-02183053, HAL.
    11. Niklas Potrafke, 2006. "Political Effects on the Allocation of Public Expenditures: Empirical Evidence from OECD Countries," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 653, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    12. Arnt Hopland, 2014. "Voter information and electoral outcomes: the Norwegian list of shame," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 233-255, October.
    13. Florian Dorn, 2021. "Elections and Government Efficiency," ifo Working Paper Series 363, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
    14. Margarita Katsimi & Vassilis Sarantides, 2015. "Public investment and reelection prospects in developed countries," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(2), pages 471-500, October.
    15. Klein, Fabio Alvim & Sakurai, Sergio Naruhiko, 2015. "Term limits and political budget cycles at the local level: evidence from a young democracy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 21-36.
    16. Troeger, Vera & Schneider, Christina J., 2012. "Strategic Budgeteering and Debt Allocation," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 85, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    17. Linda Gonçalves Veiga, 2013. "Voting functions in the EU-15," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 157(3), pages 411-428, December.
    18. Eric Dubois, 2016. "Political Business Cycles 40 Years after Nordhaus," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-01291401, HAL.
    19. Susana Peralta & João Pereira dos Santos, 2020. "Who seeks reelection: local fiscal restraints and political selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 184(1), pages 105-134, July.
    20. Matz Dahlberg & Eva Mörk, 2011. "Is There an Election Cycle in Public Employment? Separating Time Effects from Election Year Effects," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 57(3), pages 480-498, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Chile; oportunismo político; ciclo político presupuestario; elecciones municipales; gasto social;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • H72 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Budget and Expenditures
    • H75 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Government: Health, Education, and Welfare
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • R50 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - General
    • R51 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Regional Government Analysis - - - Finance in Urban and Rural Economies

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:enedoc:0010. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Roberto Cardenas (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/enecocl.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.