IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v43y2010i2p143-166.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Long-term relationships as safeguards

Author

Listed:
  • Rafael Rob
  • Huanxing Yang

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:43:y:2010:i:2:p:143-166
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0421-1
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-008-0421-1
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-008-0421-1?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Taylor, Curtis R, 2000. "The Old-Boy Network and the Young-Gun Effect," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 871-891, November.
    2. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    3. Watson, Joel, 2002. "Starting Small and Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 176-199, January.
    4. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
    5. Joel Sobel, 2006. "For Better or Forever: Formal versus Informal Enforcement," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(2), pages 271-298, April.
    6. Glenn Ellison, 1994. "Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with Anonymous Random Matching," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(3), pages 567-588.
    7. Avinash Dixit, 2003. "On Modes of Economic Governance," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(2), pages 449-481, March.
    8. Mortensen, Dale T, 1982. "Property Rights and Efficiency in Mating, Racing, and Related Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(5), pages 968-979, December.
    9. Simon Johnson & John McMillan, 2002. "Courts and Relational Contracts," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 221-277, April.
    10. Parikshit Ghosh & Debraj Ray, 1996. "Cooperation in Community Interaction Without Information Flows," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 491-519.
    11. Watson, Joel, 1999. "Starting Small and Renegotiation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 52-90, March.
    12. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
    13. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Aggregate Demand Management in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 90(5), pages 881-894, October.
    14. Kali, Raja, 1999. "Endogenous Business Networks," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 615-636, October.
    15. Jan Eeckhout, 2006. "Minorities and Endogenous Segregation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(1), pages 31-53.
    16. Michihiro Kandori, 1992. "Social Norms and Community Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(1), pages 63-80.
    17. Kranton, Rachel E, 1996. "The Formation of Cooperative Relationships," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 214-233, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2010. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Games with Social Norms," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-715, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    2. Conley, John P. & Neilson, William S., 2013. "Endogenous coordination and discoordination games: Multiculturalism and assimilation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 176-191.
    3. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 993-1021.
    4. Defever, Fabrice & Fischer, Christian & Suedekum, Jens, 2016. "Relational contracts and supplier turnover in the global economy," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 147-165.
    5. Rafael Rob & Huanxing Yang, 2010. "Long-term relationships as safeguards," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 43(2), pages 143-166, May.
    6. Huck, Steffen & Lünser, Gabriele K. & Tyran, Jean-Robert, 2012. "Competition fosters trust," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 195-209.
    7. David McAdams, 2011. "Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(4), pages 107-142, November.
    8. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    9. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2013. "Diverse Behavior Patterns in a Symmetric Society with Voluntary Partnerships," Working Papers e062, Tokyo Center for Economic Research.
    10. Fujimoto, Junichi & Lee, Junsang, 2020. "Optimal self-financing microfinance contracts when borrowers have risk aversion and limited commitment," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 60-79.
    11. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2015. "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 423-460, November.
    12. Jackson, Matthew O. & Watts, Alison, 2010. "Social games: Matching and the play of finitely repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 170-191, September.
    13. Furusawa, Taiji & Kawakami, Toshikazu, 2008. "Gradual cooperation in the existence of outside options," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 378-389, November.
    14. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo.
    15. Engseld, Peter & Bergh, Andreas, 2005. "Choosing Opponents in Prisoners' Dilemma: An Evolutionary Analysis," Working Papers 2005:45, Lund University, Department of Economics.
    16. Frédéric Schneider & Roberto A. Weber, 2013. "Long-term commitment and cooperation," ECON - Working Papers 130, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bodoh-Creed, Aaron L., 2019. "Endogenous institutional selection, building trust, and economic growth," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 169-176.
    2. Filip Vesely & Chun-Lei Yang, 2013. "On Optimal Social Convention in Voluntary Continuation Prisoner's Dilemma Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 4553, CESifo.
    3. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2009. "Voluntarily Separable Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 76(3), pages 993-1021.
    4. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara & Nobue Suzuki, 2015. "Efficiency may improve when defectors exist," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 60(3), pages 423-460, November.
    5. Pin, Paolo & Rogers, Brian W., 2015. "Cooperation, punishment and immigration," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 160(C), pages 72-101.
    6. Felipe Balmaceda, 2004. "Network Formation and Cooperation," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 208, Econometric Society.
    7. W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006. "Reputations, Relationships and the Enforcement of Incomplete Contracts," CESifo Working Paper Series 1730, CESifo.
    8. Bose Gautam, 2010. "The Fragmentation of Reputation," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-36, April.
    9. Takako Fujiwara-Greve & Masahiro Okuno-Fujiwara, 2006. "Voluntarily Separable Prisoner's Dilemma," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-415, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    10. James M. Malcomson, 2012. "Relational Incentive Contracts [The Handbook of Organizational Economics]," Introductory Chapters,, Princeton University Press.
    11. Jan Eeckhout, "undated". "Competing Norms of Cooperation," Penn CARESS Working Papers fa8d3cedc3b97259070110325, Penn Economics Department.
    12. Tom Potoms & Tom Truyts, 2020. "Unhappy is the land without symbols - Group symbols in infinitely repeated public good games," Working Paper Series 1720, Department of Economics, University of Sussex Business School.
    13. Furusawa, Taiji & Kawakami, Toshikazu, 2008. "Gradual cooperation in the existence of outside options," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 378-389, November.
    14. Dhillon, Amrita & Rigolini, Jamele, 2011. "Development and the interaction of enforcement institutions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 95(1), pages 79-87.
    15. Rauch, James E. & Watson, Joel, 2003. "Starting small in an unfamiliar environment," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(7), pages 1021-1042, September.
    16. Fischer, Christian, 2020. "Optimal payment contracts in trade relationships," MPRA Paper 101956, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Xie, Huan & Lee, Yong-Ju, 2012. "Social norms and trust among strangers," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 548-555.
    18. Daron Acemoglu & Alexander Wolitzky, 2015. "Sustaining Cooperation: Community Enforcement vs. Specialized Enforcement," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000001179, UCLA Department of Economics.
    19. Christian Fischer‐Thöne, 2023. "Optimal Payment Contracts In Trade Relationships," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 64(4), pages 1649-1683, November.
    20. Bramoullé, Yann & Goyal, Sanjeev, 2016. "Favoritism," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 16-27.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Community games; Information flows; Heterogeneity of types; Long-term relationships; C73; C78; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:43:y:2010:i:2:p:143-166. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.