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An Experimental Investigation of Charity Rebates

Author

Listed:
  • Enrique Fatas

    (School of Business and Economics, Loughborough University)

  • Joo Young Jeon

    (Department of Economics, University of Reading)

  • Paloma Ubeda

    (School of Economics and Business, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia)

Abstract

We investigate experimentally the effects of various sources of rebates on charity donation. Subjects first play a repeated public good game (PGG) with either a low or a high endowment and then have an option to donate to a charity. They may receive a rebate on their donation either exogenously (from the experimenter) or endogenously (from the public account of the PGG), or a rebate might not be available. When the PGG endowment level is low, the endogenous rebate scheme has a negative effect on charity giving. The exogenous rebate scheme, however, does not have any such effect. If the endowment level is high and the rebate is endogenous, then other-regarding preferences become salient and boost up charity donation. Females donate more than males, but only under the endogenous rebate scheme. These results shed light on the effects of the rebate schemes on different income and demographic factors, and provide with relevant policy implications.

Suggested Citation

  • Enrique Fatas & Joo Young Jeon & Paloma Ubeda, 2019. "An Experimental Investigation of Charity Rebates," Economics Discussion Papers em-dp2019-12, Department of Economics, University of Reading.
    • Handle: RePEc:rdg:emxxdp:em-dp2019-12
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    File URL: http://www.reading.ac.uk/web/FILES/economics/emdp201912.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    donation; rebate; dictator game; public good game;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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