IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ran/wpaper/wr-1162.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Opting out of Retirement Plan Default Settings

Author

Listed:
  • Jeremy Burke
  • Angela A. Hung
  • Jill E. Luoto

Abstract

The introduction of automatic enrollment (AE) features into employer sponsored defined contribution plans has greatly increased retirement plan participation by automatically enrolling employees into their employers' plans. We analyze administrative data provided by Vanguard on approximately 100,000 newly hired employees who are eligible for 206 unique plans featuring automatic enrollment. We find that most participants will at some point take an "active" stance towards their retirement savings by choosing either a different contribution rate or investment portfolio than that specified by their plan's default settings. Among our sample of over 95,000 newly hired employees participating in their employer's AE plan, we find that 59 percent elect a different contribution rate, investment portfolio, or both within the first few years of participation. Selecting a different contribution rate is considerably more common than selecting different investments: 57 percent of participants choose a contribution rate different than the default, while only 17 percent elect a different investment portfolio. Moreover, among those that select a different contribution rate, roughly two thirds increase their contribution rate above that specified by their plan while another third decreases their contribution rate below the plan default. When examining what characteristics are predictive of becoming an active participant, we find that women are slightly more likely than men to choose a contribution rate different than the default, and do so by reducing their contribution levels on average. Conversely, participants with higher incomes are more likely to select contribution rates above the default than their lower- income peers. Plan-level characteristics are also important predictors of choosing a contribution rate different than the default. In particular, participants are more likely to actively increase their contribution rates if they are in plans that offer immediate vesting of employer contributions, or if they face a default contribution rate this is too low to receive the maximum possible employer match. Conversely, participants are more likely to reduce their contributions below the default rate if they participate in plans that feature default enrollment in automatic escalation (a plan feature under which a participant's contribution rate automatically increases over time), or plans that initially have a default deferral percentage above 3 percent (the median default contribution rate in our data). When it comes to choosing a different investment portfolio than the default, we find that men, those with higher incomes, and participants in plans that feature immediate vesting of employer contributions are more likely to choose their own investment portfolio.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeremy Burke & Angela A. Hung & Jill E. Luoto, 2017. "Opting out of Retirement Plan Default Settings," Working Papers WR-1162, RAND Corporation.
  • Handle: RePEc:ran:wpaper:wr-1162
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/WR1100/WR1162/RAND_WR1162.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John Beshears & James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2010. "The Impact of Employer Matching on Savings Plan Participation under Automatic Enrollment," NBER Chapters, in: Research Findings in the Economics of Aging, pages 311-327, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian & Andrew Metrick, 2002. "Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least Resistance," NBER Chapters, in: Tax Policy and the Economy, Volume 16, pages 67-114, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Luković Stevan & Marinković Srđan, 2019. "Comparative Analysis of Retirement Benefits in Private Pension Funds and Public Pension System," Economic Themes, Sciendo, vol. 57(2), pages 145-164, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Alicia H. Munnell & Laura Quinby, 2010. "Why Did Some Employers Suspend Their 401(k) Match?," Issues in Brief ib2009-10-2, Center for Retirement Research, revised Feb 2010.
    2. Justin Falk & Nadia Karamcheva, 2019. "The Effect of the Employer Match and Defaults on Federal Workers’ Savings Behavior in the Thrift Savings Plan: Working Paper 2019-06," Working Papers 55447, Congressional Budget Office.
    3. Asen Ivanov, 2021. "Optimal pension plan default policies when employees are biased," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 23(3), pages 583-596, June.
    4. Mitchell, O.S. & Piggott, J., 2016. "Workplace-Linked Pensions for an Aging Demographic," Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, in: Piggott, John & Woodland, Alan (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Population Aging, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 0, pages 865-904, Elsevier.
    5. Di Giannatale, Sonia & Roa, María José, 2016. "Formal Saving in Developing Economies: Barriers, Interventions, and Effects," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 8107, Inter-American Development Bank.
    6. Brown, Zachary & Johnstone, Nick & Haščič, Ivan & Vong, Laura & Barascud, Francis, 2013. "Testing the effect of defaults on the thermostat settings of OECD employees," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 128-134.
    7. Laurent E. Calvet & John Y. Campbell & Paolo Sodini, 2007. "Down or Out: Assessing the Welfare Costs of Household Investment Mistakes," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115(5), pages 707-747, October.
    8. Choi, James J. & Haisley, Emily & Kurkoski, Jennifer & Massey, Cade, 2017. "Small cues change savings choices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 378-395.
    9. Amromin, Gene & Huang, Jennifer & Sialm, Clemens, 2007. "The tradeoff between mortgage prepayments and tax-deferred retirement savings," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(10), pages 2014-2040, November.
    10. Francisco Gomes & Michael Haliassos & Tarun Ramadorai, 2021. "Household Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 59(3), pages 919-1000, September.
    11. James J. Choi & David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, 2009. "Mental Accounting in Portfolio Choice: Evidence from a Flypaper Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 2085-2095, December.
    12. Brigitte C. Madrian, 2012. "Matching Contributions and Savings Outcomes: A Behavioral Economics Perspective," NBER Working Papers 18220, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Fisher, Jack & Gavazza, Alessandro & Liu, Lu & Ramadorai, Tarun & Tripathy, Jagdish, 2024. "Refinancing cross-subsidies in the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 158(C).
    14. Halit Yanıkkaya & Zeynep Aktaş Koral & Sadettin Haluk Çitçi, 2023. "The Power of Financial Incentives versus the Power of Suggestion for Individual Pension: Are Financial Incentives or Automatic Enrollment Policies More Effective?," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(4), pages 1-18, February.
    15. Cox, James C. & Kreisman, Daniel & Dynarski, Susan, 2020. "Designed to fail: Effects of the default option and information complexity on student loan repayment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 192(C).
    16. Teodoras Medaiskis & Tadas Gudaitis & Jaroslav Mečkovski, 2018. "Second pension pillar participants' behaviour: the Lithuanian case," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 6(2), pages 620-635, December.
    17. Johan Saeverud, 2024. "The Impact Of Social Security Eligibility And Pension Wealth On Retirement," CEBI working paper series 24-05, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics. The Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality (CEBI).
    18. Jennifer Alonso Garcia & Hazel Bateman & Johan Bonekamp & Ralph Stevens, 2017. "Retirement drawdown defaults: the role of implied endorsement," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/300025, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    19. Arulsamy, Karen & Delaney, Liam, 2022. "The impact of automatic enrolment on the mental health gap in pension participation: Evidence from the UK," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(C).
    20. Sulka, Tomasz, 2023. "Planning and saving for retirement," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 160(C).

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ran:wpaper:wr-1162. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Benson Wong (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/lpranus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.