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Market failure with moral hazard and side trading

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  • Kahn, Charles M.
  • Mookherjee, Dilip

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  • Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1995. "Market failure with moral hazard and side trading," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 159-184, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:58:y:1995:i:2:p:159-184
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    1. Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
    2. Charles Kahn & Dilip Mookherjee, 1988. "A Competitive Efficiency Wage Model with Keynesian Features," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(4), pages 609-645.
    3. Kahn Charles M. & Mookherjee Dilip, 1995. "Coalition Proof Equilibrium in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-138, June.
    4. Richard Arnott & Joseph Stiglitz, 1986. "The Welfare Economics of Moral Hazard," Working Paper 635, Economics Department, Queen's University.
    5. Prescott, Edward C & Townsend, Robert M, 1984. "Pareto Optima and Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(1), pages 21-45, January.
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    11. Myerson Roger B., 1995. "Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 9(1), pages 35-65, April.
    12. Kletzer, Kenneth M, 1984. "Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(374), pages 287-307, June.
    13. Bernheim, B. Douglas & Peleg, Bezalel & Whinston, Michael D., 1987. "Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I. Concepts," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-12, June.
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    16. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1986. "Moral hazard and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, February.
    17. Kahn, Charles M. & Mookherjee, Dilip, 1992. "The good, the bad, and the ugly: Coalition proof equilibrium in infinite games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 101-121, January.
    18. John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott & Bruce D. Smith, 1988. "Organizations in Economic Analysis," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 21(3), pages 477-491, August.
    19. Helpman, Elhanan & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1975. "On moral hazard in general equilibrium theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 8-23, February.
    20. Rogerson, William P, 1985. "Repeated Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(1), pages 69-76, January.
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    Cited by:

    1. Guha, Brishti & Chowdhury, Prabal Roy, 2013. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 86-102.
    2. Borys Grochulski, 2007. "Optimal Personal Bankruptcy Design: A Mirrlees Approach," 2007 Meeting Papers 1008, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. OZERTURK, Saltuk, 2006. "Hedge markets for executives and corporate agency," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2006009, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    4. Kaniska Dam & Prabal Roy Chowdhuri, 2015. "Incentives and Competition in Microfinance," Working Papers DTE 579, CIDE, División de Economía.
    5. Charles M. Kahn & Francisco Rivadeneyra & Tsz-Nga Wong, 2020. "Eggs in One Basket: Security and Convenience of Digital Currencies," Working Papers 2020-032, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    6. Boǧaçhan Çelen & Saltuk Özertürk, 2007. "Implications of Executive Hedge Markets for Firm Value Maximization," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(2), pages 319-349, June.
    7. Dilip Mookherjee, 1999. "Contractual Constraints on Firm Performance in Developing Countries," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 98, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
    8. Richard Arnott & Chong-en Bai & Brian Sack, 1996. "Latent Policies: An Extended Example," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 353., Boston College Department of Economics.
    9. Boğaçhan Çelen & Saltuk Özertürk, 2012. "Acquisition Of Information To Diversify Contractual Risk," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 53(1), pages 133-156, February.
    10. Brishti Guha & Prabal Roy Chowdhury, 2012. "Micro-finance competition: Motivated micro-lenders, double-dipping and default," Discussion Papers 12-01, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi.

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