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Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions

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  • KRISHNA, K.
  • THURSBY, M.

Abstract

Recent work in optimal trade policy for imperfectly competitive markets usually identifies the optimal level of an instrument, and when more instruments are allowed, general interpretations have been unavailable, This paper analyzes the jointly optimal levels of a Variety of instruments with oligopolistic competition. A targeting principle for identifying optimal policies is derived using the concept of a "strategic distortion." It is shown how optimal policies vary with the distortions present and the number of firms, as well as assumptions about market segmentation and regulation. The principles of targeting are illustrated using agricultural marketing boards.
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Suggested Citation

  • Krishna, K. & Thursby, M., 1991. "Optimal Polocies with Strategic Distortions," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1004, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:pur:prukra:1004
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    1. Just, Richard E & Schmitz, Andrew & Zilberman, David, 1979. "Price Controls and Optimal Export Policies under Alternative Market Structures," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(4), pages 706-714, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Elsayyad, May & Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Fighting multiple tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 295-305.
    2. Jagdish Bhagwati, 1989. "Is free trade passé after all?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 125(1), pages 17-44, March.
    3. Ishikawa, Jota & Spencer, Barbara J., 1999. "Rent-shifting export subsidies with an imported intermediate product," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 199-232, August.
    4. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W, 1992. "The Sensitivity of Strategic and Corrective R&D Policy in Battles for Monopoly," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 33(4), pages 795-816, November.
    5. Costinot, Arnaud, 2008. "A comparative institutional analysis of agreements on product standards," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 197-213, May.
    6. Dermot Leahy & Catia Montagna, 1998. "Targeted Strategic Trade Policy with Domestic Cost Heterogeneity," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 100, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    7. Karp, Larry & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1993. "Why Industrial Policies Fail: Limited Commitment," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt8ss076xw, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
    8. Dinopoulos, Elias & Livanis, Grigorios & West, Carol, 2010. "Country of Origin Labeling (C.O.O.L.): How cool is it?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(4), pages 575-589, October.
    9. Ngo, Van Long & Soubeyran, Antoine, 1997. "Cost heterogeneity, industry concentration and strategic trade policies," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(1-2), pages 207-220, August.
    10. Karp, Larry S & Perloff, Jeffrey M, 1995. "Why Industrial Policies Fail: Limited Commitment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 36(4), pages 887-905, November.
    11. Marion Desquilbet & Hervé Guyomard, 1999. "Public policy in vertically related markets : a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model," Post-Print hal-02283456, HAL.
    12. Brander, James A., 1995. "Strategic trade policy," Handbook of International Economics, in: G. M. Grossman & K. Rogoff (ed.), Handbook of International Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 27, pages 1395-1455, Elsevier.
    13. Kala Krishna, 1998. "The adding up problem: a targeting approach," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 7(2), pages 151-173.
    14. Bagwell, Kyle & Staiger, Robert W., 1994. "The sensitivity of strategic and corrective R&D policy in oligopolistic industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1-2), pages 133-150, February.
    15. Praveen Kujal & Juan Ruiz, 2003. "International Trade Policy towards Monopolies and Oligopolies," International Trade 0302002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Mar 2003.
    16. Winston Chang & Hajime Sugeta, 2005. "Cost asymmetry, oligopolistic competition and optimal trade and industrial policies," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(1), pages 95-114.
    17. Kala Krishna & Kathleen Hogan & Phillip Swagel, 1989. "The Non-Optimality of Optimal Trade Policy: The U.S. Automobile Indust ry Revisited, 1979-1985," NBER Working Papers 3118, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu, 1996. "Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes: a fallacy of composition," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 369-380, August.
    19. Thursby, Marie C. & Thursby, Jerry G., 1991. "Strategic Trade Theory and Agricultural Markets: An Application to Canadian and U.S. Wheat Exports to Japan," Occasional Papers 233062, Regional Research Project NC-194: Organization and Performance of World Food Systems.
    20. Desquilbet, Marion & Guyomard, Herve, 1999. "Public Policy In Vertically Related Markets: A Cournot Oligopoly-Oligopsony Model," 1999 Annual meeting, August 8-11, Nashville, TN 21561, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).

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