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Public policy in vertically related markets : a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model

Author

Listed:
  • Marion Desquilbet

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

  • Hervé Guyomard

    (ESR - Unité de recherche d'Économie et Sociologie Rurales - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique)

Abstract

Ce document propose une modélisation des politiques appliquées sur les marchés liés verticalement d'un produit agricole brut et d'un produit agricole transformé, dans le cas où les firmes transformatrices exercent du pouvoir de marché vers l'amont (producteurs agricoles) et vers l'aval (consommateurs finaux). Le cadre retenu est celui d'un modèle d'équilibre partiel à deux pays et à deux marchés liés verticalement. Les producteurs du bien intermédiaire sont en concurrence parfaite, et il existe un nombre fixe de firmes transformatrices dans chaque pays, caractérisées par un comportement de Cournot vers l'amont et vers l'aval. L'analyse s'attache alors à caractériser l'intervention optimale par des instruments de prix dans un pays exportateur aux deux stades, dans un jeu où le gouvernement choisit les niveaux des instruments de prix dans un premier stade. Le principe du ciblage est utilisé pour caractériser l'intervention optimale en présence d'une contrainte de revenu minimal vers les producteurs agricoles.

Suggested Citation

  • Marion Desquilbet & Hervé Guyomard, 1999. "Public policy in vertically related markets : a Cournot oligopoly-oligopsony model," Post-Print hal-02283456, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02283456
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-02283456
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. McCorriston, Steve & Sheldon, Ian M, 1996. "The Effects of Vertical Markets on Trade Policy Reform," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 48(4), pages 664-672, October.
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    6. Cheng, Leonard K, 1988. "Assisting Domestic Industries under International Oligopoly: The Relevance of the Nature of Competition to Optimal Policies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 746-758, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arijit Mukherjee, 2002. "Licensing in a Vertically Separated Industry," Industrial Organization 0211005, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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