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Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain

Author

Listed:
  • Can Urgun

    (Princeton University)

  • Leeat Yariv

    (Princeton University, CEPR, NBER)

Abstract

We study a model of retrospective search in which an agent—a researcher, an online shopper, or a politician—tracks the value of a product. Discoveries beget discoveries and their observations are correlated over time, which we model using a Brownian motion. The agent, a standard exponential discounter, decides the breadth and length of search. We fully characterize the optimal search policy. The optimal search scope is U-shaped, with the agent searching most ambitiously when approaching a breakthrough or when nearing search termination. A drawdown stopping boundary is optimal, where the agent ceases search whenever current observations fall a constant amount below the maximal achieved alternative. We also show special features that emerge from contracting with a retrospective searcher.

Suggested Citation

  • Can Urgun & Leeat Yariv, 2021. "Retrospective Search: Exploration and Ambition on Uncharted Terrain," Working Papers 2021-33, Princeton University. Economics Department..
    • Handle: RePEc:pri:econom:2021-33
    as

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    File URL: https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/07292021-retrospectivesearch.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Whitmeyer, Mark, 2023. "Submission costs in risk-taking contests," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 101-112.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Retrospective Search; Drawdown Stopping Boundary; Contracting;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • D25 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice: Investment, Capacity, and Financing
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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