On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games
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References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Nikolai Kukushkin, 2007.
"Congestion games revisited,"
International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 36(1), pages 57-83, September.
- Nikolai S. Kukushkin, 2004. "Congestion Games Revisited," Game Theory and Information 0412010, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 02 Feb 2006.
- Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2010.
"Club networks with multiple memberships and noncooperative stability,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 12-20, September.
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2009. "Club Networks with Multiple Memberships and Noncooperative Stability," CAEPR Working Papers 2009-005, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
- Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002.
"Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination,"
Economic Research Papers
269414, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Tone Arnold & Myrna Wooders, 2005. "Dynamic Club Formation with Coordination," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0522, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Arnold, Tone & Wooders, Myrna, 2002. "Dynamic Club Formation With Coordination," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 640, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Milchtaich, Igal, 2009. "Weighted congestion games with separable preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 750-757, November.
- Page Jr., Frank H. & Wooders, Myrna, 2009.
"Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 462-487, May.
- Frank H. Page, Jr. & Myrna H. Wooders, 2006. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0614, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
- Frank Page & Myrna Wooders, 2007. "Strategic Basins of Attraction, the Path Dominance Core, and Network Formation Games," CAEPR Working Papers 2007-020, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Department of Economics, Indiana University Bloomington.
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