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Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis

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  • Batabyal, Amitrajeet

Abstract

In this note we analyze a simple game model of effort and time investment in an arranged marriage where the goal of the two partners making this investment is to create a better marital relationship. We first specify the best response functions of the two married partners. Next, we solve for the Nash equilibrium and then argue that this equilibrium is unique. Finally, we delineate an interesting connection between the two best response functions in our model and the corresponding best response functions in the well known two-player Cournot game.

Suggested Citation

  • Batabyal, Amitrajeet, 2016. "Making an arranged marriage work: A game-theoretic analysis," MPRA Paper 71199, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 06 May 2016.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:71199
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/71199/1/MPRA_paper_71199.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Greenberg, Joseph & Luo, Xiao & Oladi, Reza & Shitovitz, Benyamin, 2002. "(Sophisticated) Stable Sets in Exchange Economies," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 54-70, April.
    2. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
    3. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 2004. "Meetings and exposure before an arranged marriage: a probabilistic analysis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 11(8), pages 473-476.
    4. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    5. Amitrajeet Batabyal & Hamid Beladi, 2002. "Arranged or love marriage? That is the question," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(13), pages 893-897.
    6. Amitrajeet Batabyal, 1998. "Aspects of Arranged Marriages and the Theory of Markov Decision Processes," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 241-253, December.
    7. Tracy J. Cornelius, 2003. "A Search Model of Marriage and Divorce," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(1), pages 135-155, January.
    8. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Batabyal, Amitrajeet & Yoo, Seung Jick, 2016. "Effort Application in an Arranged Marriage: A Game-Theoretic Analysis," MPRA Paper 74745, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arranged Marriage; Effort; Nash Equilibrium; Static Game; Strategic Complements;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J12 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Marriage; Marital Dissolution; Family Structure

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