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A theory of quality signaling in the marriage market

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  • Anderson, David A.
  • Hamori, Shigeyuki

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  • Anderson, David A. & Hamori, Shigeyuki, 2000. "A theory of quality signaling in the marriage market," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 229-242, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:japwor:v:12:y:2000:i:3:p:229-242
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    1. Pollak, Robert A, 1977. "Price Dependent Preferences," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 64-75, March.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1981. "A Treatise on the Family," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number beck81-1.
    3. Peters, H Elizabeth, 1986. "Marriage and Divorce: Informational Constraints and Private Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(3), pages 437-454, June.
    4. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
    5. Becker, Gary S, 1985. "Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(1), pages 33-58, January.
    6. Lundberg, Shelly & Pollak, Robert A, 1993. "Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(6), pages 988-1010, December.
    7. Boulier, Bryan L & Rosenzweig, Mark R, 1984. "Schooling, Search, and Spouse Selection: Testing Economic Theories of Marriage and Household Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 92(4), pages 712-732, August.
    8. Basmann, R L & Molina, D J & Slottje, D J, 1983. "Budget Constraint Prices as Preference Changing Parameters of Generalized Fechner-Thurstone Direct Utility Functions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(3), pages 411-413, June.
    9. Rubinstein, Ariel & Wolinsky, Asher, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1133-1150, September.
    10. Becker, Gary S, 1973. "A Theory of Marriage: Part I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(4), pages 813-846, July-Aug..
    11. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, April.
    12. Carl Shapiro, 1983. "Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(4), pages 659-679.
    13. Hutchens, Robert M, 1979. "Welfare, Remarriage, and Marital Search," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(3), pages 369-379, June.
    14. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-349, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nicolas Vaillant, 2004. "Discrimination in matchmaking: evidence from the price policy of a French marriage bureau," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 723-729.
    2. Fang, Li & Tian, Chuanhao, 2018. "Housing and marital matching: A signaling perspective," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(C), pages 27-46.
    3. Gaelle Guirriec & Nicolas Vaillant, 2005. "From Libertinism to Marital Commitment: The Economics of Marital Search with Heterogeneous Agents," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 85-98, January.
    4. Vaillant, Nicolas G. & Harrant, Valérie, 2008. "Determinants of the likelihood of finding the right partner in an arranged marriage: Evidence from a French matchmaking agency," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(2), pages 657-671, April.
    5. Vaillant, Nicolas G., 2004. "Estimating the time elapsed between ending a relationship and joining a matchmaking agency: Evidence from a French marriage bureau," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 789-802, December.

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