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George Orwell and the Incoherence of Democratic Socialism

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  • Makovi, Michael

Abstract

George Orwell's famous fictions, Animal Farm and Nineteen-Eighty Four were intended to advocate democratic socialism by portraying undemocratic forms of socialism as totalitarian. For Orwell, democracy was a political institution which would limit the abuse of power. But there are several problems with democratic socialism which ensure its failure. In Orwell's novel A Clergyman's Daughter, Orwell's views of economics and politics are inconsistent and conflicting in a way that ensures democratic socialism will not succeed on Orwell's terms. Democratic socialism in general is criticized according to F. A. Hayek's Road to Serfdom and John Jewkes's The New Ordeal by Planning, whose arguments differ crucially from those against market socialism by Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny. An economic analysis of the political institutions of democratic socialism shows that democratic socialism must necessarily fail for political (not economic) reasons even if nobody in authority has ill-intentions or abuses their power.

Suggested Citation

  • Makovi, Michael, 2015. "George Orwell and the Incoherence of Democratic Socialism," MPRA Paper 62527, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:62527
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.
    2. Michael Makovi, 2015. "George Orwell as a Public Choice Economist," The American Economist, Sage Publications, vol. 60(2), pages 183-208, September.
    3. Hayek, F. A. & Caldwell, Bruce, 2007. "The Road to Serfdom," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, number 9780226320540 edited by Caldwell, Bruce, Febrero.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
    5. John Jewkes, 1978. "A Return to Free Market Economics?," Palgrave Macmillan Books, Palgrave Macmillan, number 978-1-349-03542-7, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Orwell; Hayek; democratic socialism; market socialism; totalitarianism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • A12 - General Economics and Teaching - - General Economics - - - Relation of Economics to Other Disciplines
    • B24 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Socialist; Marxist; Scraffian
    • B25 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Austrian; Stockholm School
    • B31 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals - - - Individuals
    • B51 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Socialist; Marxian; Sraffian
    • B53 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Austrian
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
    • J00 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - General - - - General
    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General
    • J47 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Coercive Labor Markets
    • P10 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - General
    • P20 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist and Transition Economies - - - General
    • P30 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - General
    • P50 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - General
    • Z11 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economics of the Arts and Literature

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