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The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade

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  • Liu, Haiyang

Abstract

The goods produced in developed nations are often of higher quality, advanced technology and better design, hence goods even with little physical mass have higher value than goods produced in developing nations. This means that if the payment is balanced between developed and developing nations, the physical mass must be unbalanced. As a result, developed nations will become increasingly heavier, and the northern hemisphere where developed nations are clustered will also become more and more heavy. The earth will be reshaped like a ice-cream. Using customs data we confirm this conjecture.

Suggested Citation

  • Liu, Haiyang, 2014. "The Unbalanced Physical Movements of International Trade," MPRA Paper 54163, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:54163
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/54163/1/MPRA_paper_54163.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Balance of Payment; Imbalance of Physical Movement; International Trade;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F14 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Empirical Studies of Trade
    • F18 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade and Environment
    • F20 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - General

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