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Resource Curse, Institutions and Non-Resource Sector

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  • Libman, Alexander

Abstract

This note presents a simple model of how resource rents can affect economic growth of a region of a centralized country, where sub-national governments have no authority over resource industries. The growth effect of resources appears to be conditional on the quality of institutions in the non-resource sector. Thus, even if the sub-national government does not affect the resource sector directly,the quality of institutions set by this government still influences whether resource boom has a positive or a negative effect on the economic growth.

Suggested Citation

  • Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Resource Curse, Institutions and Non-Resource Sector," MPRA Paper 53563, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:53563
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/53563/1/MPRA_paper_53563.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2006. "Institutions and the Resource Curse," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(508), pages 1-20, January.
    2. Fidel Perez-Sebastian & Ohad Raveh, 2016. "The Natural Resource Curse and Fiscal Decentralization," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(1), pages 212-230.
    3. Ohad Raveh, 2013. "Dutch Disease, factor mobility, and the Alberta Effect: the case of federations," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 46(4), pages 1317-1350, November.
    4. Libman, Alexander, 2013. "Natural resources and sub-national economic performance: Does sub-national democracy matter?," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 82-99.
    5. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "Political foundations of the resource curse," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April.
    6. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2009. "Testing the neocon agenda: Democracy in resource-rich societies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 53(3), pages 293-308, April.
    7. Bankole Fred Olayele, 2010. "The Resource Curse: A State and Provincial Analysis," Working Papers 2010-01, University of Victoria, Department of Economics, Resource Economics and Policy Analysis Research Group.
    8. Olayele, Bankole Fred, 2010. "The Resource Curse: A State and Provincial Analysis," Working Papers 57805, University of Victoria, Resource Economics and Policy.
    9. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
    10. Alexander Libman, 2012. "Sub-national political regimes and asymmetric fiscal decentralization," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 302-336, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Vasilyeva, Olga & Libman, Alexander, 2020. "Varieties of authoritarianism matter: Elite fragmentation, natural resources and economic growth," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource curse; institutions; non-resource sector;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • Q38 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy (includes OPEC Policy)

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