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A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy

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  • Perote-Pena, Juan
  • Piggins, Ashley

Abstract

We present a model of collective decision making in which aggregation and deliberation are treated simultaneously. In our model, individuals debate in a public forum and potentially revise their judgements in light of deliberation. Once this process is exhausted, a rule is applied to aggregate post-deliberation judgements in order to make a social choice. Restricting attention to three alternatives, we identify conditions under which a democracy is “truth-revealing”. This condition says that the deliberation path and the aggregation rule always lead to the correct social choice being made, irrespective of the original profile of judgements and irrespective of the size of the electorate (provided the latter is finite).

Suggested Citation

  • Perote-Pena, Juan & Piggins, Ashley, 2012. "A model of deliberative and aggregative democracy," MPRA Paper 48914, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:48914
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Catherine Hafer & Dimitri Landa, 2007. "Deliberation as Self-Discovery and Institutions for Political Speech," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(3), pages 329-360, July.
    2. List, Christian & Pettit, Philip, 2002. "Aggregating Sets of Judgments: An Impossibility Result," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 89-110, April.
    3. Gaertner,Wulf, 2006. "Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521028745, October.
    4. List, Christian & Polak, Ben, 2010. "Introduction to judgment aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(2), pages 441-466, March.
    5. Anand, Paul & Pattanaik, Prasanta & Puppe, Clemens (ed.), 2009. "The Handbook of Rational and Social Choice," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199290420.
    6. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    7. Christian List, 2005. "The probability of inconsistencies in complex collective decisions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 24(1), pages 3-32, May.
    8. Broome, John, 2006. "Weighing Lives," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199297702.
    9. Dryzek, John S. & List, Christian, 2003. "Social Choice Theory and Deliberative Democracy: A Reconciliation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 33(1), pages 1-28, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Pankaj Koirala & Raja Rajendra Timilsina & Koji Kotani, 2021. "Deliberative Forms of Democracy and Intergenerational Sustainability Dilemma," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(13), pages 1-18, July.
    2. Antoinette Baujard & Muriel Gilardone, 2013. "Individual judgments and social choice in Sen's idea of justice and democracy," Post-Print halshs-00950320, HAL.
    3. Gerald Pech, 2017. "Cycles and Optimistic Stability in Graphs: The Role of Competition, Veto Players and Moderators," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 5(1), pages 1-13, June.
    4. Frances Drake, 2018. "Risk Society and Anti-Politics in the Fracking Debate," Social Sciences, MDPI, vol. 7(11), pages 1-22, November.
    5. Chaim Fershtman & Uzi Segal, 2024. "Social influence in committee deliberation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 96(2), pages 185-207, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social choice theory; deliberative democracy; epistemic perspective.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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