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Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique
[Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks]

Author

Listed:
  • Chopard, Bertrand
  • Langlais, Eric

Abstract

This paper studies the influence of bankruptcy law (depending on whether the law is pro-lenders or pro-borrowers) on the borrowers propensity to demand the renegotiation of their debt, when there exist an asymmetrical information between lenders and borrowers. In the tradition of Law & Economics, we proceed to a study of impact for the main parameters of the model that capture the design of bankruptcy law, showing their influence on the probability of strategic bankruptcy and on the social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2007. "Renégociation stratégique de la dette, risque comptable et risque juridique [Strategic Bankruptcy with accountable and judicial risks]," MPRA Paper 4805, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:4805
    as

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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4805/1/MPRA_paper_4805.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, 2007. "Heuristics and Biases in Bankruptcy Judges," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 163(1), pages 167-186, March.
    2. Povel, Paul, 1999. "Optimal "Soft" or "Tough" Bankruptcy Procedures," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(3), pages 659-684, October.
    3. Stanley D. Longhofer & Stephen R. Peters, 2000. "Protection for whom? creditor conflicts in bankruptcy," Working Papers (Old Series) 9909R, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.
    4. Bolton, Patrick & Scharfstein, David S, 1996. "Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(1), pages 1-25, February.
    5. Ichino, Andrea & Polo, Michele & Rettore, Enrico, 2003. "Are judges biased by labor market conditions?," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(5), pages 913-944, October.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    bankruptcy law; strategic debt repudiation; judicial risk and debt renegotiation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K0 - Law and Economics - - General
    • G0 - Financial Economics - - General
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • K35 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Personal Bankruptcy Law
    • K2 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law
    • G29 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Other

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