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Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress

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  • Nicola Gennaioli
  • Stefano Rossi

Abstract

In a financial contracting model, we study the optimal debt structure to resolve financial distress. We show that a debt structure where two distinct debt classes coexist--one class fully concentrated and with control rights upon default, the other dispersed and without control rights--removes the controlling creditor's liquidation bias when investor protection is strong. These results rationalize the use and the performance of floating charge financing, which refers to debt financing where the controlling creditor takes the entire business as collateral, in countries with strong investor protection. Our theory predicts that the efficiency of contractual resolutions of financial distress should increase with investor protection. The Author 2012. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Nicola Gennaioli & Stefano Rossi, 2013. "Contractual Resolutions of Financial Distress," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 26(3), pages 602-634.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rfinst:v:26:y:2013:i:3:p:602-634
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    Cited by:

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    2. Cerqueiro, G.M. & Ongena, S. & Roszbach, K., 2011. "Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates and Monitoring : Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2011-087, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Rodano, Giacomo & Serrano-Velarde, Nicolas & Tarantino, Emanuele, 2016. "Bankruptcy law and bank financing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(2), pages 363-382.
    4. Aßmuth, Pascal, 2017. "Stock price related financial fragility and growth patterns," Economics Discussion Papers 2017-108, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    5. Ongena, Steven & Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Roszbach, Kasper, 2016. "Collateral damage? On collateral, corporate financing and performance," Working Paper Series 1918, European Central Bank.
    6. Miguel García-Posada & Juan Mora-Sanguinetti, 2014. "Are there alternatives to bankruptcy? A study of small business distress in Spain," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 5(2), pages 287-332, August.
    7. Giambona, Erasmo & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Matta, Rafael, 2022. "Stiffing the creditor: Asset verifiability and bankruptcy," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 52(C).
    8. Nicola Gennaioli & Enrico Perotti, 2009. "Standardized enforcement: Access to justice vs contractual innovation," Economics Working Papers 1329, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jun 2012.
    9. Hans Degryse & Vasso Ioannidou & Erik von Schedvin, 2016. "On the Nonexclusivity of Loan Contracts: An Empirical Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(12), pages 3510-3533, December.
    10. Stefano Colonnello & Michael Koetter & Moritz Stieglitz, 2021. "Benign Neglect Of Covenant Violations: Blissful Banking Or Ignorant Monitoring?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 459-477, January.
    11. Gregory F Udell, 2015. "SME Access to Intermediated Credit: What Do We Know and What Don't We Know?," RBA Annual Conference Volume (Discontinued), in: Angus Moore & John Simon (ed.),Small Business Conditions and Finance, Reserve Bank of Australia.
    12. Lars Schweizer & Andreas Nienhaus, 2017. "Corporate distress and turnaround: integrating the literature and directing future research," Business Research, Springer;German Academic Association for Business Research, vol. 10(1), pages 3-47, June.
    13. Daher, Mai, 2017. "Creditor control rights, capital structure, and legal enforcement," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 308-330.
    14. Claude Fluet & Paolo G. Garella, 2014. "Debt Rescheduling with Multiple Lenders: Relying on the Information of Others," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 81(324), pages 698-720, October.
    15. Favara, Giovanni & Morellec, Erwan & Schroth, Enrique & Valta, Philip, 2017. "Debt enforcement, investment, and risk taking across countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 22-41.
    16. Rossi, Stefano & Yun, Hayong, 2024. "The political economy of municipal bankruptcy," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 239(C).
    17. Zacharias Sautner & Vladimir Vladimirov, 2018. "Indirect Costs of Financial Distress and Bankruptcy Law: Evidence from Trade Credit and Sales [Bankruptcy codes and innovations]," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 22(5), pages 1667-1704.
    18. Geraldo Cerqueiro & Steven Ongena & Kasper Roszbach, 2016. "Collateralization, Bank Loan Rates, and Monitoring," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(3), pages 1295-1322, June.
    19. Gui, Zhengqing & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig & Zhao, Xiaojian, 2019. "Incentive-compatibility, limited liability and costly liquidation in financial contracting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 412-433.
    20. Cerqueiro, Geraldo & Ongena, Steven & Roszbach, Kasper, 2020. "Collateral damaged? Priority structure, credit supply, and firm performance," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 44(C).

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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