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Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque

Author

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  • Eric Langlais

    (EconomiX - EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

Le droit du licenciement expose-t-il les entreprises françaises à un "risque judiciaire"? L'article discute les arguments des différentes thèses (Blanchard et Tirole (2003), Cahuc et Kramarz (2004), Munoz-Perez et Serverin (2005)) en interprétant les informations empiriques disponibles relatives aux décisions des salariés (acceptation/contestation) et des entreprises (choix du motif de licenciement) à partir des instruments de l'économie du risque. Nous montrons que l'analyse des données relatives aux recours devant les Prud'Hommes suggère de la part des salariés une attitude nettement moins riscophobe (voire clairement riscophile) que celle habituellement révélée sur les marchés du risque. Par ailleurs, nous montrons que le licenciement pour motif personnel n'apparait comme systématiquement préférable au motif économique que dans la mesure où les entreprises sont supposées riscophobes. A l'inverse, la comparaison du coût anticipé d'un licenciement entre le motif économique et le motif personnel apparait très sensible aux hypothèses concernant l'ancienneté du salarié, le taux de rejet du salarié devant les Prud'Hommes, ou le coût indirect du licenciement.

Suggested Citation

  • Eric Langlais, 2008. "Le "risque judiciaire" et les licenciements en France: le point de vue de l’économie du risque," Working Papers hal-04140724, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:wpaper:hal-04140724
    Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04140724
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    licenciements; Prud’Hommes; risque judiciaire;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J63 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Turnover; Vacancies; Layoffs
    • J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

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