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Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?

Author

Listed:
  • Régis Blazy
  • Bertrand Chopard
  • Agnès Fimayer
  • Jean-Daniel Guigou

Abstract

We study the French dilemma associated with court administered resolution of corporate financial distress of firms, in which bankruptcy courts have to combine both social efficiency (maintaining employment) and ex post financial efficiency (determining the best issue for financial distress, proxied here by the global recovery rate). We discuss this dilemma empirically, using a large sample of decisions of French commercial courts concerning the future of bankrupt firms (reorganization, sale as a going concern or liquidation). Addressing this dilemma, we discuss the determinants of bankruptcy courts’ selection between rival offers in sales as a going concern. Finally, we evaluate the financial cost of the French pro debtor system through the recovery rates of various claimants. Our main results are: (1) French commercial courts actively work to protect employment by facilitating continuation and reducing the domino effects of bankruptcy. (2) the courts’ choice between rival buyout offers confirms that social considerations prevail in the arbitration of bankruptcy courts. (3) Continuations through reorganization plans generate the highest recovery rates for all classes of creditors. (4) Contrary to the expected trade-off between social and financial efficiency, courts also enact measures to increase debt recovery once continuation has been chosen. However, for sales, recovery rates are inhibited by asset illiquidity and/or by the courts’ attempt to promote a firm’s continuation through sales at a low price.

Suggested Citation

  • Régis Blazy & Bertrand Chopard & Agnès Fimayer & Jean-Daniel Guigou, 2009. "Financial versus Social Efficiency of Corporate Bankruptcy Law: the French Dilemma?," Working Papers of BETA 2009-12, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulp:sbbeta:2009-12
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Chopard, Bertrand & Langlais, Eric, 2009. "Défaut de paiement stratégique et loi sur les défaillances d'entreprises [Strategic default and bankruptcy law]," MPRA Paper 14366, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Dewaelheyns, Nico & Van Hulle, Cynthia, 2009. "Filtering speed in a Continental European reorganization procedure," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 375-387, December.
    3. Jose M Garrido & Mr. Wolfgang Bergthaler & Ms. Chanda M DeLong & Juliet Johnson & Amira Rasekh & Anjum Rosha & Natalia Stetsenko, 2019. "The Use of Data in Assessing and Designing Insolvency Systems," IMF Working Papers 2019/027, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Giuseppe Arcuri & Nadine Levratto & Marianna Succurro, 2023. "Does commercial court organisation affect firms’ bankruptcy rate? evidence from the french judicial reform," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 55(3), pages 573-601, June.
    5. Ingrid Groessl & Nadine Levratto, 2012. "International Similarities of Bank Lending Practices and Varieties of Insolvency Laws: a Comparative Analysis of France and Germany," Macroeconomics and Finance Series 201203, University of Hamburg, Department of Socioeconomics.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bankruptcy; Reorganization; Liquidation; Recovery rate.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law

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