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Lessons for Procurement and Contract Management Practice in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Quantitative Study

Author

Listed:
  • Watson, Glyn
  • Lonsdale, Chris
  • Peng, Fei
  • Sanderson, Joe

Abstract

We contribute to the literature on procurement and contract management in the public sector by reporting on the current practice of public and private sector organisations and the outcomes of that practice. In particular, we chart the effectiveness of certain procurement and contract management actions in moderating potential supplier opportunism. The article is based upon a quantitative analysis of 180 questionnaire responses provided by procurement and contract managers. The results are not totally conclusive, but do provide evidence to suggest that opportunism is a significant possibility, and that certain procurement and contract management actions can assist organisations in dealing with that possibility. The results suggest little difference between public and private sector experiences. JEL classification:

Suggested Citation

  • Watson, Glyn & Lonsdale, Chris & Peng, Fei & Sanderson, Joe, 2012. "Lessons for Procurement and Contract Management Practice in the Public Sector: Evidence from a Quantitative Study," MPRA Paper 47686, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:47686
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Procurement; contract management; opportunism; structural equation model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C38 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Classification Methdos; Cluster Analysis; Principal Components; Factor Analysis
    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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