The international mercury cartel, 1928-1949
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References listed on IDEAS
- José Luis García Ruiz, 2007. "Nacionalizando el capital bancario: Banesto y Paribas (1902-1927)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, vol. 9, pages 79-108.
- Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, 2002. "What Determines Cartel Success?," UMASS Amherst Economics Working Papers 2002-01, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Economics.
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As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:- Are Cartels Pragmatic Responses to Market Failures?
by berodsat in NEP-HIS blog on 2013-07-08 18:30:55
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More about this item
Keywords
Mercury; Cartels; International trade; history;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
- N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2013-05-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-HIS-2013-05-11 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-IND-2013-05-11 (Industrial Organization)
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