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The money-burning refinement: With an application to a political signalling game

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  • Hans Gersbach

Abstract

We define an equilibrium refinement in signalling games by allowing agents to refine the game by burning money whenever they can act. We apply the refinement in a model where the public is unsure about the ability of an agent, say a government, to foresee the effects of long-term decisions. A government with ample information about the consequences of decisions should invest either immediately or not at all. Poorly informed agents should wait for better information. We identify pooling equilibria in which excessive rush or waiting occurs. The money-burning refinement may eliminate both rash and waiting pooling equilibria, but it involves wasting money and, for high discount factors, a decrease in welfare. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2004. "The money-burning refinement: With an application to a political signalling game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 33(1), pages 67-87, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:33:y:2004:i:1:p:67-87
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820400185
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Campaigns, political mobility, and communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
    2. Souza, Filipe & Rêgo, Leandro, 2012. "Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational," MPRA Paper 43410, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
    4. Martin Gregor & Dalibor Roháč, 2009. "The Optimal State Aid Control: No Control," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(1), pages 093-113, March.
    5. Vladimir Karamychev & Bauke Visser, 2017. "Optimal signaling with cheap talk and money burning," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 46(3), pages 813-850, August.
    6. Hedlund, Jonas, 2015. "Persuasion with communication costs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 92(C), pages 28-40.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    C72; D72; D82; D83; Rush and delay; money-burning refinement; belief-change; signalling in politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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